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Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, the former Crownlands of
Austria-Hungary which now make up the western half of
Czechoslovakia, had for centuries a population mixture of
40% German, 60% Czech.

The national reawakening of the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries pitted the majority
Czechs against their German minority master.

This, coupled

with the social upheavals caused by the industrial
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revolution, brought Czechs and Germans in Bohemia to center
stage in the nationality conflict in the multinational
Empire.
The universal practice in industrializing nations of
the population to shift from rural to the industrial centers
was especially significant in Bohemia, for the Germans
controlled the cities and large industry as well as the
great mining concerns located in the all-German districts of
the Crownlands' rim mountain ranges.

The sudden influx of

Czechs seeking unskilled work heightened job competition and
resulted in racial ill-will which eventually found
expression in the social and political milieu of the times.
The more radical German elements, of which Bohemia was
a stronghold, advocated the complete suppression of Czech
national aspirations and sought to maintain the German
Herrenvolk idea in Cisleithania.

Their Czech counterparts

regarded the Bohemian Germans as merely invaders or
colonists--in any case subject to the Czech majority well
within Bohemia.
There were, however, moderates on both sides who sought
compromise.

The German-Bohemian moderate nationalists

advocated the administrative partitioning of Bohemia along
ethnic lines--Zweiteilung.

Czech leaders, with a few

outstanding exceptions, rejected Zweiteilung, arguing that
the historic borders of the old kingdom of Wenseclas were
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inviolable--externally and internally.

The right of the

Czechs to maintain their state within the Empire-Staatsrecht--became the Czech battle cry against the German
concept of Zweiteilung.
Between 1880 and 1914 one settlement proposal after
another was rejected.

Chances for a settlement waned as

tensions increased.
During World War I Czech exiles in Paris and London,
with the blessings of the Entente, pushed for a Czechoslovak
independent state (before even radical Czech nationalists
had envisioned a state within the Empire).

The

Bohemian-Germans continued to push for Zweiteilung.
At war's end the Czechs proclaimed their republic but
the Bohemian Germans refused to recognize Prague and instead
swore allegiance to the new Austrian republic, with Vienna
in turn claiming German Bohemia.
The autonomous Province of German-Bohemia lasted a
stormy six weeks while both sides waged diplomatic war, each
seeking the blessings of the victorious Allied Powers.
Slowly, beginning in November 1918, Czechoslovak troops
began occupying the German districts, meeting virtually no
resistance.

By mid-December the Czechs controlled all

Bohemia.
By the opening sessions of the Paris Peace Conference
the Czechoslav Delegation, with Foreign Minister Eduard
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at its head, could present a diplomatic and de facto

fait accompli to the body, which accepted Czechoslovak
demands and incorporated 3.5 million Germans along with
their 80% German inhabited area into the new Republic of
Czechoslovakia.
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PREFACE
Long before Adolf Hitler made his claims that the socalled Sudetenlands of Czechoslovakia were his own, the idea
of the ethnic partitioning of Bohemia had been a heated
issue.

As early as 1848 proposals along such lines earned

serious consideration in the Austrian parliament.
Nowhere in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were two
nationalities so pitted against each other as were the
Germans and the Czechs in Bohemia.

More Western in

historical experience and culture than any of their Slav
sisters, the Bohemian Czechs claimed the same rights to
national integrity as did the Bohemian Germans during the
nineteenth century.

The Czech challenge to Austro-German

hegemony naturally resulted in a clash.
This work will examine that clash and the issue of the
ethnic partition in Bohemia by concentrating on three
principal phases of its development.
First, Czech-German relations from 1848 to 1870 will be
examined with special emphasis on the socio-political impact
of the industrial revolution on the two nationalities in
neo-absolutist Austria.
Secondly, the German-Bohemian reaction to the rising
Czech Bourgeoisie and especially to the great Czech

vii
migration into the all-German industrial areas along
Bohemia's mountainous rim will be examined with special
attention given to the German attempts to thwart the
"Czechification" of all Bohemia by a great variety of
proposals aimed at Bohemia's administrative partition.
Lastly, this work will examine the continued GermanBohemian efforts during the First War, their successful but
short-lived establishment of an actual autonomous Province
of German-Bohemia within Czechoslovak-claimed area, and the
international reactions during the last months of 1918.
The term "Bohemia" often applies to the three
Crownlands of Bohemia made up of Bohemia, Moravia and
Silesia.

In this work confusion is spared by referring to

the singular Crownland of Bohemia as "Bohemia" or "Crownland
of Bohemia."

All three in a group are referred to as "the

Crownlands," the "Historic Crownlands," etc.

CHAPTER I
HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CZECH-GERMAN CONFLICT
Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, first president of the
Republic of Czechoslovakia, gave his inaugural address in
Prague on December 22, 1918.

In reference to the largest

minority group, which made up nearly one-third of the new
state's population, President Masaryk said:
• • • as far as the Germans in our lands are
concerned, our programme has been known for a long
time: the territory on which they settled is our
territory and will remain so. We have created this
State and this determines the constitutional
position of our Germans who originally entered the
country as immigrants and colonists. [l]
The problems arising from a considerable second
nationality within Western Czechoslovakia are older than the
empire from which this "successor state" emerged.

To

better understand the problem and the wide variety of
proposed solutions a brief look back to its origins is in
order.
PRE-HABSBURG
Who was there first?

The general consensus is that

Celtic tribes, referred to as "Boii" by Tacitus, inhabited
the Bohemian Basin first [2].

These eventually mixed with
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pre-Christian Germans penetrating from the north around 300
B.C.

During the next 800 years the Boii of Tacitus'

"Boiohaemum" migrated into what is now Bavaria " • . • taking
the Celt name which apparently developed into 'Baiowari'"
[3], a recognizable ancestor of the name today.
In any case, Slavic peoples moved into the resulting
vacuum and settled extensively in Moravia and Bohemia.

"It

is probably correct to regard the period from the sixth to
the twelfth century as a period when the inhabitants of
Bohemia and Moravia were almost entirely Slav" [4].
During the Christian era the region developed into an
ethnically Slav region with a Western orientation.

Prague

became a bishopric under the Archbishop of Mainz in 973 and,
thus, placed the Crownlands of King Wenceslas under
extensive German influence.

Except for a brief respite--the

German exodus during Hussite times--this German influence
was to last until 1918.
From the Church came German clergy and lay
professionals.

These were followed by German miners who

settled in the silver-rich mountainous areas in Bohemia's
Randgebiet or rim areas of the country.

By the late

thirteenth century German artisans, bourgers and merchants
had set themselves up in the growing commercial centers of
Prague, Brunn, Budweis, Pilsen and others.
The attraction was great, for the emigres enjoyed
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extended privileges over the indigenous Slavs [SJ.
Meanwhile Prague had become the administrative center
of the Holy Roman Empire.

It boasted its first university,

founded by Emperor Charles IV (King of Bohemia, Charles I)
in 1348, where Czechs as well as Germans attended and
taught.
This "Golden Age" came to a close characteristically
due to Czech-German strife centered at the university after
Charles' death.

As mentioned above, there followed an

exodus of German learned men from Bohemia.

The exodus was

short lived, however.
By the beginning of the sixteenth century Germans were
again moving into the Historic Provinces of Bohemia, Moravia
and Silesia [6].
This time, however, the heretic Hussite Czech was
sharing the Crownlands with heretic Lutheran Germans.

A

lull in the German-Czech nationality conflict therefore
resulted as they faced their common enemy together--the
Roman church [7].
The political ties between the Bohemian Crownlands and
Hungary predate the inclusion of the Austrian Duchies.

The

so-called "Personal Union" of the crowns of St. Wenceslas
and St. Stephan dates from 1490 with the marriage of
Ladislav II, first of the Jagiellon dynasty, to the sister
of the king of Hungary.

Their issue, Louis II, King of
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Bohemia and Hungary, married a Habsburg. A condition of the
marriage contract was that if Louis II produced no heirs,
the entire Jagiellon lands would fall into Habsburg hands.
In 1526 at the Battle of Mohacs Louis fell, and without
an heir.

The Jagiellon kingdom, including Hungary, became a

possession of the Habsburg Hausmacht and there remained for
four hundred years.

"This • • • marriage set the seal upon

the amazing match-making achievements of the house of
Habsburg" [8].
AUSTRIAN BOHEMIA TO 1848
Fifteen twenty-six marks the date when the German
miners, merchants and churchmen of the Bohemian Crownlands
were no longer foreign invitees, but fellow Germans of the
ruling Habsburgs.
The Habsburg "Kings of Bohemia" greatly Germanized the
"Historic Crownlands," as they were called.

Even the Czech

nobility found it necessary to adapt to the new
circumstances.

But when, in the seventeenth century, German

became the official language of government in Prague; and as
ever more land was falling into German hands, the Czech
nobility, still a viable force, became determined to halt
the German advance.

"In 1615 the Diet [at Prague] forbade

the acquisition of land in Bohemia by anyone who could not
speak Czech" [9].
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This marks the first official designation of
nationality based on language in the Crownlands or, put
another way, the use of language as a weapon against an
opposing nationality.

The language question shall

eventually become the key focal point in territorial
partition movements.
In any case all Czech aspirations were dashed five
years later at White Mountain.

From 1620 on, the dignity of

Bohemia as a kingdom ceased to exist as the Crownlands
became a virtual province of Habsburgian Austria.
For this study, the consequences of the Thirty Years
War which followed White Mountain are significant, for they
mark the virtual disappearance of a viable Czech nobility
and its particularist local power.

The estates of the

erstwhile Czechs so troublesome to the Emperor were
confiscated and distributed among those noblemen, Czech and
German, upon whom Vienna could rely [10].
An old stratification was strengthened.
• • • the general effect of the upheavals of the
seventeenth century was to create a state of
affairs in which the upper strata were German and
the lower were Czech. Thus, the outlines of the
social question of the nineteenth century were
beginning to appear.
[11]
Also, a new wave of Germans ranging from displaced
princes to peasants filled the vacuum in the greatly
depopulated Crownlands.
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• • • the territory inhabited by Germans in Bohemia
and Moravia increased during the seventeenth
century so that by 1700 the language [and so
ethnic] frontiers were drawn for some two hundred
years. [13]
With the ethnic borders basically fixed by 1700 the
stage was set for the marathon tug of war between Czech and
German concerning the ethno-linguistically based territorial
partition of Bohemia.

(See Appendix, Map 1.)

Two remaining periods must first be examined which
contribute to the definition of Czech-German relations.

The

first is the Enlightenment, which tended to strip both Czech
and German power within Bohemia and subjugate them to
Vienna; and the second is the romantic national awakening
which gave the socially repressed Czechs a feeling of
renewed self.
As mentioned above, by 1700 the indigenous powers
within Bohemia had been greatly curtailed.

The estates

general of the Bohemian Crownlands, according to the
Vernewerte Landesordnung or "Decree of Denial" of 1627, no
longer had the right to elect their own king.

They would

have their King of Bohemia but only because Bohemia became a
hereditary possession of the Habsburgs [13].
During the Aufklirung, a string of "enlightened
desp'otsi• further reduced the political independence of
Bohemia and Moravia by removing their respective Diets from
Prague and Brunn and placing their workings within the
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Viennese bureaucracy.

In short, there no longer existed

decision-making bodies within the Bohemian Crownlands.
The positive side of the centralizing policies,
especially under Maria Theresia, was that the new state of
affairs fell just as hard on the German estates in the
Crownlands as it did on the Czechs.

"It was her

[Theresia's] policy to reduce the Estates to insignificance"
(14].

By so doing she created a kind of "leveling" among

the nationalities.

She was attempting to create what

Professor Seton-Watson refers to as an "a-national empire."
Joseph II brought reforms with his reign.

He threw out

the Jesuits who had monopolized education in their attempt
to root out Hussitism in the Crownlands; the "Robot" system
of servitude which had reduced the peasantry to virtual
serfdom was officially abolished (though in fact it
continued for another century) •
These reforms, however, mattered little to the average
Czech.

The general inertia of the past could not be

legislated away so easily.

By the end of Joseph's reign in

1790, "Bohemia was totally in the hands of the [Viennese]
bureaucrats; it was officially German, tolerantly Catholic
and wholly absolute in form of government" (15].
For the nationalities of the Habsburg lands, especially
the Czechs, the very reactionary centralizing policies of
Vienna provoked a need to be heard.

This, coupled with the
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new ideas of equality and liberty embraced in the French
Revolution, had a strong effect on all suppressed
nationalities of the empire.
A spirit of nationalism was in the air.

This, mixed

with the rationalist movement of eighteenth century France,
Herter's infectious philosophy of the identity of language
with nation all had a profound effect on especially the
Czechs.

The almost forgotten works of Hus, Chelcicky and

Comenius were revived and studied [16].
For this study the interpretations of Professor
Wiskemann are especially apt.
Out of the Age of Enlightenment • • • was born the
Romantic Revival and the spirit of modern
nationalism and the Czech-German problem as we know
it to-day [ 19 3 8] •
[ 1 7]
The greatest contributer to the Czech national revival
was Franticek Palacky.

His famous multi-volume work,

A History of the Czech People (1836), had much to do with
kindling Czech nationalist pride in a past that could stand
up to that of the so-called culturally superior Germans.
"Palack§ hoped that a proper presentation of [Czech]
history, notably the epoch of its greatest achievement,
would help arouse the nation" [18].
It is indeed ironic and telling of the times that in
order to assure publication of his work, Palacky had to write
his History of the Czech People in the German language.

As
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a matter of fact, Palacky required the patronage of one

Count Sternberg, a German, in order to get the work past the
Viennese censors.
This was, however, not so odd, for there had been a
marriage of convenience between the Czech and German
nobility in order to attempt a re-establishment of home
rule.

This link-up of Czech and German for the common sake

of "Bohemianism" was bound to fail, however.

The current

language theories linking tongue, race and nation were too
strong.

In the next decades, many Czechs were to look east

of their borders toward their Slav brethren and identify
with the concept of "Slavism," while the Bohemian Germans
were to look west toward the Hohenzollern-Prussian brand of
"Germanism" and to turn away from the "Rome-influenced"
"Slav-infested" Habsburgs.

10

CHAPTER I ENDNOTES
1.

President Masaryk's inaugural address of December 22,
1918, quoted from J. w. Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before
Munich: The German Minority Problem and British Appeasement
Policy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973),
pp. 19-20.

2.

See Tacitus' Germania, Nos. 28, 42.

3.

Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans: A Study in
the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (London:
Oxford University Press [under auspices of the Royal
Institute of International Affairs], 1938), p. 3.

4.

Ibid.

5.

Oscar Taszi, The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp.
38-9.

6.

Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p. 9.

7.

Seton-Watson, Czechs and Slovaks, p. 90.

8.

Ibid., p. 86.

9.

Wiskemann, p. 9.

10.

Ibid., p. 10.

11.

Ibid.

12.

Ibid.

13.

Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 15211918 (Berkeley: University of Califronia Press, 1974),

p:5°4.
14.

Seton-Watson, Czechs and Germans, p. 140.

15.

Ibid., p. 161.

16.

Ibid. pp. 161-2.

17.

Wiskemann, p. 14.

11
18.

~

Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Meaning of Czech History
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
compiled 1974), p. 123.

CHAPTER II
FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 TO 1890:
POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
The February Revolution of 1848 in France, based as it
was on such high-minded notions of fraternity, liberty and
equality, became, once imported to central Europe, distorted
to accomodate the prevailing social and political grievances
whose roots lie in racial rivalries.
For this study three main levels of this rivalry must
be considered:

first, the position of Austria in relation

to the rest of the German Confederation; second, the
position of Bohemia within the Danubian Empire; and finally,
the conditions within binational Bohemia.
The upheavals of 1848 revived the question last heard
in 1815 with the establishment of the German Confederation:
Grossdeutschland or Kleindeutschland?
The grossdeutsch idea visualized a united federal
Germany with Austria included (excluding Hungary, Galicia
and most of Slavonia) •
[It] represented the wishes • • • of the [German]
Austrian liberals and moderate conservatives • • •
the liberals believed that the German association
and Austria's independence as a great power were
compatible.
[1]

13
The kleindeutsch advocates, who foresaw Austria out
from the Confederation, found little support among the
Austrian German liberals, but they did find it among the
Czech nationalists such as Palacky and his son-in-law,
Ladislav Rieger, who later became the leader of the Old
Czech Party.
The Czech nationalists feared that the inclusion of
Austria, with her array of non-Germans, in anything other
than a confederation would result in the complete submersion
of Czech rights in a German sea.

...

.

Palacky and Rieger felt

that so long as Germany remained un-unified, Austria could
easily remain the presiding member.

If Germany were to

unite, however, whether under Frankfurt or Prussia, not only
would German Austria be relegated to a lower level within
the new body, but the Slavs would become a real minority
whereas in Austria alone they actually represented the
majority race (with Galicia and Slavonia attached).
In the first Austrian parliament ever convened the
Czech representatives placed themselves to the right of the
Liberals who condemned them for not supporting the
revolution.

The Czech position, however, had more to do

with survival as a viable national entity than being anticonstitutional.
The Czechs made up the strongest faction of the right.
They were, however, politically committed to the liberal
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constitution concepts of the revolutionary era.

On the

national question, however, they were vigorous opponents to
the militant Germans and condemned Frankfurtism [2].
The Czech position vis-a-vis the German Liberal is best
illlustrated by Palacky's refusal to sit at Frankfurt
representing Bohemia.

He responded by drafting a letter to

the Frankfurt body explaining his belief in the necessity of
maintaining the Austrian Empire as a great power and
condemned the Liberal grossdeutsch idea of its destruction.
A Bohemian-German named Hartmann attended in Palacky's stead
and spoke at St. Paul's church, advocating militarily
forcing Bohemia into "Germany" in order to protect Germans
in the Sudeten areas [3).

Representative Hartmann's

utterances are not only prophetic, they also illustrate a
nationalistic bent found in the German settled areas of
Bohemia which later would develop into a radical nationalism
found nowhere else in Austria.
Not surprisingly, the parliamentary left was
predominantly German and pro-Frankfurt.

The Germans were

also embued with anti-Slav sentiment [4].
The interest of the Crown was, of course, the
territorial integrity of the Monarchy and the preservation
of Austria as a great power.

It had to ally itself with a

strong faction in Parliament, but which one?

The German

Liberals, though fiercely nationalistic (considering Germans
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the only Herrenvolk in Central Europe), were anti-Vienna,
pro-grossdeutsch and in their radical wing advocated the
Habsburg demise.

The Center was moderate in its demands.

It advocated a continued strong monarchy, but was simply too
weak to hold any kind of majority in policy votes.

A

majority could only be achieved by aligning with the Slav
right which served as an antidote to Frankfurtism [5].
Therefore, the Czechs found themselves in the role of
uneasy champions of the very power that had usurped their
royal dignity--the Habsburg Crown.

Together the "King of

Bohemia" and those who no longer had the right to elect him
faced off the German Liberals.
KREMSIER AND ETHNIC PARTITION
Throughout the summer of 1848 the infant Austrian
Parliament struggled.

Little was accomplished, save the

final emancipation of the peasants; and when fresh violence
broke out in Vienna in October, Emperor Ferdinand decided to
summon parliament's next session in the quieter atmosphere
of the small episcopal Moravian town of Kremsier [6].

It

was here that the first proposal for an ethno-territorial
partition of Bohemia was made.
In January 1849, a liberal constitution was drafted
whose principal designer was the Czech delegation leader,
Franticek Palacky, who proposed that Austria be divided into
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four groups, two of which were a German-Austrian and a
Bohemian group.
The significance of this draft is that "[Palacky] would
have been ready to accept the severance of 'German-Bohemia'
from the Czech districts" [7].

Palacky was proposing a

federation of nationalities, not territories.

A later draft

included Hungary but still held to the principle of national
divisions as opposed to divisions along historical
boundaries.

He proposed instead of four " • • • eight

federal groups:

(1) German-Austria, including the Sudetian

[sic] districts;

(2) the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia,

Silesia, together with Slovakia)" [8].

There was no reason,

however, to believe that Hungary would ever hand over
Slovakia.
Unable to carry the drafting committee to a federalized
national empire, Palacky returned to the only obvious
alternative to national federalism--Staatsrecht.

This

principle of the indivisability of the three Crownlands
within the "Historic Borders" of the Bohemian King Wenceslas
became almost sacred to the Czech nationalists for the
remainder of their struggle for statehood.

Basically it

stood in opposition to the principle of national selfdetermintion and upheld the principle of historic rights.
Thus, according to Staatsrecht, the Germans living in the
Kronlander were first Bohemians, secondly Austrians, due to
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the right of the Bohemian Staat to remain whole.
As mentioned above, unable to carry the drafting
committee to a federalized national empire which would have
put each nationality on an equal footing,
Palacky wavered between • • • the nationalist and
the historic solution, a return to 'States' Rights'
[historic] being for the Czechs the most obvious
alternative to federalism. [9]
The final draft was a necessary compromise between
centralism " • • • proposed by most Germans, and federalism
[either along ethnic or historic-traditional lines] as
favored by most of the Slavic" [10].
Contrary to Palacky's proposal of the national
partition of the Crownlands, the historic borders were to be
left unchanged.

However, mechanisms were proposed to

address the national issue.
The nationally mixed Crownlands [were to be]
subdivided into homogeneous districts [Kreisel,
whose representatives were [to be] added to the
Crownland delegation in the upper chamber [in
Vienna]. The traditional political entities were
thus preserved, [historic Crownlands, Staatsrecht]
• • • and yet a national organization • • • was
provided. [11]
In March 1849 the Austrian parliament at Kremsier was
dissolved, and the constitution was never enacted.

The new

Emperor, Franz-Joseph, with the aid and under the influence
of Prince Felix von Scharzenburg, had militarily gained the
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upper hand and had no need to recognize a parliamentarian
document.

The constitution that was issued only slightly

resembled that of Kremsier and was octroian in nature.
Kremsier constitution is not a dead letter, however.

The
Within

this document lies seeds of future struggles.
The very rejection of Palacky's national federation
scheme by the drafting committee marks the beginning of the
Czech position of Staatsrecht.

As mentioned above, this

doctrine of the indivisibility of the Bohemian Crownlands
within their historical borders became so entrenched in the
minds of the Czech leaders that it sustained Czech national
hopes until its final realization at the Paris Peace
Conference of 1919.
One also finds the embryo of future German-Bohemian
demands in the creation of homogeneous Kreise within the
historic borders.

These groupings of single nationalities

were German inventions which served to weaken the province
and, thus, the very elements of a federalized Austria [12].
The last thing the Bohemian Germans wanted was a strong
democratic Bohemia in an Austrian Federation.

By creating

semi-autonomous German areas within Bohemia (Kreise) , the
Germans could maintain their German cultural character,
privileged position and politically thwart the Czech notion
of Staatsrecht (but more on that below) •
Liberalism and nationalism both were strong forces
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during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but there
were others.

Behind the political stage the dynamics of

industrialization were beginning to have an impact upon
Bohemians in general and upon the relations of Czech to
German within the Crownlands in particular.

To better

understand the social and political consequences of the
industrial revolution, a quick survey of Bohemia's unique
geography is in order.
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND ITS SOCIAL IMPACT
IN LIGHT OF GEOGRAPHY
The ancient kingdom of the Bohemian Crownlands held an
interior position within Europe.

With the loss of Lusatia

and most of Silesia to the Prussians in the eighteenth
century, the Crownlands became even more centralized and
individualized.

"The role of the mountain girdle protects

the individuality of the region which it encloses" [13].
The area resembles a basin--a relatively flat center
with mountains enclosing it on three sides.

Palacky

referred to Bohemia as a Kessel or kettle, the breakup of
which would render it no longer useful (obviously a postKremsier reflection of Staatsrecht).

As outlined above, the

Germans settled in the enclosing mountains, while the Czechs
inhabited the central basin.

The Germans operated the

mining industry, while the Czechs engaged in agriculture on
some of Europe's most fertile land.

The capacity of the
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Czech central basins to produce food was matched only by the
German-inhabited mountains' capacity to produce minerals.
What is here important is that due to the very poor soil in
the mountainous areas, the Germans were dependent upon the
Czechs for food, while the needs of the Czechs for solid
fuels, chemicals, and other minerals could only be satisfied
by the Germans.
Bohemia was a textbook example of economic
interdependency between two nationalities.

With the coming

of the industrial revolution, it naturally fell to the
German-inhabited mining areas to fill Bohemia's energy
needs.

The importance of the Randgebiet to modern Austria's

economic well being rose sharply.
In the first decades of the nineteenth century
mining was still of little consequence to the
economy.
[In 1819] • • • annual production of coal
was about 85,000 tons. Only with the introduction
of the steam engine and • • • railroad did the need
for solid fuels take off.
(14]
The railroad opened new industrial markets and was soon
burning coal while hauling coal, which replaced wood in the
homes.

"By 1848 annual production was already 600,000 tons1

seven years later that • • • tripled to 1.8 million tons
annually" (15].
It is true that the Germans were not the only
beneficiaries of the industrial revolution.

The Continental

System blockade of the Napoleonic period had given rise to
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new industries everywhere to replace those goods previously
imported to Central Europe.

Most significant was the sugar

beet industry that today still flourishes.

One must

remember, however, that though Czech entrepreneurs did
exist, the great agricultural estates, Grossgrundbesitze,
were often in the hands of those who had close ties to
Vienna.
Beyond that, processing and shipping of all produced
goods, agricultural or otherwise, was invariably dependent
upon solid fuels, mostly lignite from the German areas.
• • . the consumption of • • • coal in AustriaHungary in 1875 [stands as] 15 percent by
railroads, 55 percent in manufacturing, much in
sugar beet refining, and 28 percent in crafts,
services, and households.
[16]
It is true also that the largest lignite mines which
lay in German Teplitz, Brilx, Falkenau and Komotau of North
Bohemia did not match production of the anthracite mines of
Czech Silesia until 1871.

After that year, however, lignite

became the leading coal mined.

Indeed, lignite production

by 1913 was only second to that of the world's leader--the
German Reich [17].
It is worthy of mention that the Crownlands in general
were highly favored by the Austrian government.

"The

Austrians, as a matter of policy, had tended to establish
industries in the Czech lands rather than any other part of
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the Empire" (18] •
Of the Empire in total,
• • . the main producer of lignite was Bohemia with
83% followed by Styria with 12% • • • hard coal
[anthracite] came from Silesia with 46% followed by
Bohemia with 27% and Moravia with 14%.
(19]
The great significance of these figures is that in
1918, truncated Austria will find herself cut off from 85%
of her coal sources, which shall have great social and
political consequences, as we shall see.
Though Bohemia's industrial boom was hardly unique in
nineteenth century Europe, the fact that mining was
virtually confined to the districts of one ethnic group was
to have grave consequences for the ethno-social
stratification of the Crownlands in general, but especially
Bohemia, where industry was furthest developed.

(Austrian

Silesia was also highly developed industrially but the
presence of a third, Polish group tended to neutralize
ethnic discord.)
Universally, the industrial revolution set certain
trends in motion within society.

One of these was the

tendency for peasants from the countryside to flock to the
new urban, industrial centers.

In England, Germany and

America, for example, this caused great hardships and social
inequity.

In Bohemia, this was further complicated by

ethno-social division.
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The migration of Czechs from the agricultural areas
into the all-German areas eventually caused heated conflict
which found its expression in a chauvinism practiced by
Germans and Czechs alike.
Early Czech migration or "immigration," as the Germans
saw it, into German-Bohemia posed little problem, for
assimilation was both expected and carried out.

The Czech

was simply "Germanized" within the factory town--a process
not abhorrent to the Czechs themselves, for it had its
obvious economic advantages.

Besides that, the rather

exaggerated nationalism of the German-Bohemians would have
it no other way.

Czech children would attend German

schools; fathers would speak German on the job.

Within a

generation the Germanization process would be all but
complete [20].
Moreover, the Czechs were welcome.
From about 1860, German employers, especially in
the lignite area of North Bohemia, were glad to
take on Czech labour • • • • It was cheaper (and due
to a better diet) it was more virile and therefore
more satisfactory for unskilled work.
[21]
The next decades, however, saw such an intensification
of Czech migration into German areas that German workers
were being displaced.

The financial crisis of 1873 caused

keen competition for jobs.

Far from being welcomed, the

Czechs were now despised and even blamed for the troubles.
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German-Bohemian leaders, as a result, began calling for the
"sealing off" of the German areas in order to prevent what
they referred to as the "Czechif ication" of the pure German
character of their Alldeutschgebiete.
At this point it becomes necessary to understand a few
basic concepts and to become familiar with certain terms.
Convenience is served by referring to certain aspects of the
Czech-German conflict as they were heard in the Reichsrat
debates and the German press.
The German-Bohemians regarded the Czech doctrine of
Staatsrecht (the meaning of which was explained above) as
outdated medieval claptrap.

Not recognizing its principles,

the Germans sought the subdivision of Bohemia, for there the
conflict was most acute, into nationally homogeneous Kreise.
Each Kreis, of which five or six would exist, was to be made
up, as nearly as possible, of German-speaking Bezirke-something akin to an electoral or judicial precinct or
parish.

Bohemia contained a total of 221 such bodies.

The Czechs rejected the notion of partition, or
Zweiteilung, for it sought to divide what the Czechs felt
indivisible.

They further felt that the Germans in Bohemia

were simply fellow Bohemians regardless of who sat in
Vienna.

The Czechs also longed for a fair, democratic

electoral system where their majority could set the seal on
their destiny as again their own masters [22].
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POLITICAL BACKDROP
The political picture in the Empire between 1848 and
1900 can be characterized by the paradoxical definition of
an ever-fluxing status quo.
The nee-absolutism of the re-entrenched centralist
forces remained intact from the Kremsier rejection until the
death of Emperor Franz Joseph, whose reign matches those
years exactly.

This period is marked with one ministry

after another in Vienna unable or unwilling to cope with the
problems inherent in a multinational empire.
A settlement amicable to all parties became impossible.
Any solution which favored one side was seen by the other as
purchased at a cost to them.
To list all proposals and subsequent reactions would be
too lengthy and of no practical purpose.

Therefore, only

those institutions which both endured and affected GermanCzech relations will be discussed.
NEC-ABSOLUTISM
Professor Dr. Oscar Jaszi defines the return to
absolutism after 1848 in terms of the first decade's
Minister of Interior, Alexander Bach.
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The 'systeme Bach' agreed with the system of
Metternich on three substantial points: One • • •
the Germanizing Centralization • • • The second
• • . the extension of the former police and spy
system. Third • • • the total surrender of the
Empire to Catholicism and especially the Jesuits.

[23]
Seton-Watson is more succinct.
" • • • rests upon four posts:

To him the Bach system

'the soldiers upright, the

bureaucrats seated, the priests kneeling, the spies
rampant'" [24].
Now the conservative Czech position toward the
Schwarzenburg-Bach government in Vienna certainly was not
one of blind support, but leaders such as Palacky and even
less conservative factions led by Pinka and Rieger did see
the re-emergence of the conservative monarchy as a bulwark
against the real threat to Czech national and political
aspirations--the German Liberals.

"Palacki • • • did not

express reaction to the neo-absolutists centralist regime of
the fifties so much as reaction to the neo-liberal German
centralism of the sixties" [25].
The Austro-German Liberals of the right advocated a
Grossoesterreich, a centralized Viennese state, and rejected
any notion of federalism, which the Czechs favored.

The

German Liberal of the left advocated a Grossdeutschland
emanating from Frankfurt, rejected federalism on a
historical border basis, and wished to lessen the Crown
while strengthening the parliament.

They represented the
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future Social Democrats.
The left's advocacy of a federalism based on ethnic
instead of historic lines (not unlike Palacky at Kremsier)
would seem at least consistent with some Czechs who would
drop Staatsrecht for an equitable federalism--especially
after the Battle of Windesgratz in 1866, which all but
killed grossdeutsch hopes.

Surely the Czechs would fare

well within a federalism based on national entities simply
by virtue of the Slav numbers within Cisleithania.

And they

would have, if anything close to a fair electoral system
had existed--but it did not.
Electoral Geometry
The German Liberals came into power in the 1860's and
brought with them the Schmerling Curial electoral system
which served as an effective device to artificially give the
Germans of Cisleithania the majority over the Slavs.

It is

imperative to understand the basic mechanisms of this system
in order to fully comprehend its ultimate consequences once
the Czech social position began to improve.
The electorate was divided into four curiae, the great
landowners or Grossgrundbesitzer, the chambers of commerce,
the towns, and lastly, the peasants.

Germans dominated the

first three, the Czechs the fourth.
Simply put, it took fewer votes from, say, the
Grossgrundbesitzer Kurie to elect a favorite candidate,
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usually one of its own, than a peasant to elect one of his.
The higher the social status of the voter, the more the vote
counted.

Added to this was the restrictive franchise based

on taxes which, of course, reflected incomes.

The ten

guilders franchise cut out vast numbers of Czech peasants.
Practical examples of the Schmerling system are as
follows:
• • • in some districts deputies were elected by
two or three votes, in others by more than ten
thousand votes [and the ten guilder franchise]
• • • was enough to give Vienna, which then had
almost a million inhabitants, no more than 7,400
e 1 igible voters.
[ 26]
For the purposes of this study, the elections of the
Bohemian Diet in 1876 are especially revealing.
To the Bohemian Diet [221 seats] the big landowners
[a mere handful of people] could elect 70
representatives, the chambers of commerce 15, the
towns 72, the countryside 79. Thus the towns which
were German or had a high proportion of Germans had
a deputy to 11,600 inhabitants, while the country
districts, predominantly Czech--had one to 49,081
inhabitants.
[27)
In other words, it took five times more Czechs to elect a
deputy to the Diet than it did Germans.
It did not stop here.

Until the eighties, only the

provincial Diet in Prague, overwhelmingly German, could
elect from its ranks the provincial representatives to
Vienna.

Of the thirty-nine Abgeordneten sent to the
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Reich sr at from Bohemia, Palacky was the only Czech--and he
abstained out of protest.

"[It] was entirely possible for

the administration to control elections arbitrarily and
minutely" [28].
But there was a flaw in Schmerling's Wahlgeometrie.
could work to the Germans' advantage only if non-Germans
remained at the lower end of the socio-economic scale.
Indeed, a shift in the fortunes of the Czech populations
could conceivably result in the Curia system actually
working against its German designers--and that is exactly
what happened.
The Iron Ring Coalition
The general amelioration of the Czech position in the
three Crownlands was especially manifest in Bohemia.
Indeed, Bohemia represented the social and political
vanguard of the Slav world during the last decades of the
nineteenth century.

Any betterment of non-Germans was

viewed with misgiving by those who had so long held an
economic monopoly--especially in a world increasingly
governed by market competition.
In the second half of the century a Czech
'bourgeoisie' [began to develop] apace to compete
with the German employers and financiers who had
hitherto extended their power without challenge.
[29]

It
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This was quite a new feature on the Bohemian landscape.
This new breed was young, intelligent and upwardly mobile.
Moreover, they well realized that in order to get their
share they must play the game.

They condemned their older

colleagues' practice of parliamentary abstention.

It was

not because they lacked patriotism--indeed their brand of
nationalism would soon overshadow that of their older
countrymen.

It was just that the "New Czechs" practiced a

nationalism based on the hard sciences of economics and
politics--not on romantic notions of ancient rights or
indignant self-righteous indulgences such as parliamentary
abstention.
With the arrival of Count Edward Taaffe in 1879 the
Czechs returned to Vienna.

The Czech delegation was

dominated by the "Old Czechs," now led by Ladislav Rieger,
but within ten years the "Young Czechs" would become the
political prime movers.
The Taaffe Era signaled phenomenal changes within
Cisleithania.

Most important was the collapse of the German

Liberal absolute majority, which would never again control
parliament.
The strength of Premier Taaffe's government was his
creation of the so-called Iron Ring, a coalition of parties
which stood in opposition to the German Liberals.

The

backbone of this coalition lay chiefly in the return of the

31
Czechs who, as mentioned above, were beginning to use the
Curia system to their own advantage.
Czech cooperation was purchased in basically three
ways:

First, the Crown, which would do almost anything to

break the Liberal government, issued a series of Language
Decrees in 1880
enjoining the political, administrative, and
judicial authorities to use the language of •
parties involved.
[Next] a new franchise was
introduced for the Bohemian Diet [with the result
that] in the powerful [Grossgrundbesitzer Kurie]
the Czechs secured a considerable share of control
• • • and third, by Decree of April 4, 1881 the
University of Prague was divided into two entirely
distinct universities, one Czech, one German.
[30]
These three K.U.K. decrees were a great blow to the
Germans.

It may be said that they were struck socially,

economically and culturally, in that order.
The first decree is undoubtedly the most important, for
language rights of the Czechs in the German districts meant
that Germans would be forced to accommodate the evermigrating Czechs.

These and later language laws will become

the major bone of contention in the battle between
Staatsrecht and Zweiteilung, as we shall see later.
The second decree, that of a lower Grossgrundbesitzer
Kurie franchise, allowed those Czechs involved in the strong
chambers of commerce curia to advance to the even stronger
great estates curia.

But, one may ask, how did so many
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Czechs get into the cities' commercial circles in the first
place?
In order to take part in the industrial revolution
boom,

financial banking was necessary.

For the Czechs,

this was provided by the first Bohemian bank not controlled
by Vienna.

The ~ivnostenka Banke, founded in 1868, greatly

facilitated Czech industry and allowed many to enter
stronger Chamber of Commerce curiae (31].
According to Alois Brusatti, the "Zivnosterka Banku pro
Cechy a Moravu became possibly the most expressive symbol of
the Czech minority economic emancipation movement"

(32].

According to the Schmerling system, economic power and
political power were inextricably tied, so that by
• • • 1883 the Budweis Chamber of Commerce began to
send only Czechs to the Reichsrat [direct
parliament elections then possible], and there were
tremendous [election] tussles among [Czech and
German] businessmen in both Pilsen and Prague.
(33]
The Czechs had indeed learned well from the Germans the
power of the marriage of political and economic power.

What

is more, the Germans were now no longer in a position to do
anything about the situation in Parliament.
The third decree, of course, had a great impact on the
cultural pride of the Czech nation.

It is of interest that

Professor Dr. Thomas Masaryk was one of the first to be
invited to teach at the new Czech university.

l

33
To review the last forty years of the nineteenth
century, one sees the German hegemony in Austria reestablished by sham constitutionalism and lopsided rights.
The industrial revolution offered opportunities to the
Czechs who left the farm and were initially willing to
assimilate in the German areas.

By the seventies, a new,

politically aware Czech bouregoisie was beginning to emerge.
It recognized the need to challenge the German political and
social monopoly if it was to find a place in the modern
world.

It did so by using the inequitable electoral system

to its own advantage, as well as by developing financial
independence from German Vienna.

The timely arrival of

Count Taaffe and the formation of an "anti-German-Liberal"
coalition furthered the betterment of the Czechs vis-a-vis
the Germans in Bohemia--and heightened tensions.

Soon

traditionally German-controlled cities such as Pilsen and
Budweis returned Czechs only to the Reichsrat, and German
fears for and opposition to the "Czechification" of their
areas grew [34].
The Bohemian Germans were naturally alarmed.
political power was waning.

Their

(Bohemia was a stronghold of

the German Liberals of the most radical kind).

Their

devisive electoral system was backfiring, and worst of all
the very German character of their mountainous "homelands"
was being invaded.

Incoming Czechs, far from assimilating,
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began using the new Taaffe Language Decrees to set up Czech
"colonies" in German-Bohemia in a deliberate attempt to
"take back" Bohemia from the Germans--a process many felt
could only be stopped by the ethnic administrative partition
of Bohemia.
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CHAPTER III
PARTITION OF BOHEMIA:

ZWEITEILUNG OR STAATSRECHT

GERMAN CHARACTER UNDER SIEGE
As mentioned above, after the sixties and seventies
Czechs moving into the German areas, whether German cities
within the Czech portions of the country or the Germanoccupied districts along Bohemia's outer edges, were no
longer so willing to give up their national heritage as
their predecessors had been.
In the last decades of the century a Czech national
consciousness led immigrating workers to demand "national
equality" such as the use of the Czech language in public
life and the establishment of Czech schools [1].

These

rights, now guaranteed by the Language Laws of 1880 provided
the need for educated Czechs who manned the schools and
lesser bureaucrats who took posts in municipal
administrations in order to guarantee those workers,
cobblers, shopkeepers and teachers their legal access to the
judicial and administrative rights the Czechs now possessed
in Bohemia.

Czechs were favored for such posts by the

imperial officials due to their bilingual abilities.
Of all the manifestations of the new order of things,
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no one aspect caused so much concern to the Germans,
especially in the north Bohemian mining areas, as the
establishment of Czech elementary schools.

Not only did it

guarantee a Czech presence in the future of a given area,
but the new Language Laws provided Czech nationalists with a
tool which they skillfully used to promote the insidious
Czech advance into German-Bohemia.
Actually this tool had been on the books since the 1868
Constitution of the Dual Monarchy but no provision was made
for its execution, and it simply went unheeded.

The Taaffe

Laws and the political climate of the 1880's, however, put
some teeth into the law.
Article XIX of the Constitution specified that each
Bezirk was responsible for the education of its minorities.
Further it specified that if forty or more children of a
particular nationality lived within a one-half mile radius,
the local authority must provide them with a school taught
in their language.
The Czech School Union [2], founded in 1880, would
organize Czech families together in order to reach the
qualifying forty children.

If unable to assemble forty, the

Union would organize a private Czech School, often financed
by the Zivnostenka Banke, until forty could be gathered.
Once they qualified, the municipal authorities were then
obligated to take over the funding of the school, releasing
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the private funds to be used elsewhere in another German
town to start the whole process over again [3].
This is not to say that every Czech family was a
standard-bearer of Czech nationalism.

Their primary reason

for settling in the German areas was economical, their
primary goal:

security for their family.

It was chiefly

the various Czech and German nationalist "societies" that
fanned the fires of conflict.
In addition to the School Unions, the German
Sportvereine and the Czech Sokols (falcons) represented
organized outdoor activities for young men and women.

They

bordered on the para-military in content and attempted to
embue their respective members with a super-nationalism not
unlike what one will later see in the Hitler-Jugend.

The

Sokols were banned in 1915 by Austrian military authorities,
and after the Czechoslovak State was proclaimed in 1918 they
re-emerged and served as a militia in the early days of the
Czechoslovak occupation of German-Bohemia.
There also arose a network of so-called defense leagues
from both sides which were based on racial ill will [4].
If the education laws of Article XIX were the tool, it
was the Language Decrees of 1880 which provided the muscle
to apply that tool.

German opposition to the Decrees was

not merely based on their ill effects regarding Czech
expansion; it went much deeper.

The language issue in
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Bohemia was based on the conflict between the two
nationalities' divergent concepts of the relation between
language and the territory inhabited by those who speak it.
First one must distinguish between the two concepts:
the language of the land or country--Landessprache--and the
language customary in the land--Landesubliche Sprache.
Landessprache was any language spoken by 20% of the
inhabitants, in this case, Bohemia.

Both Czech and German

qualified, as approximately 40% of the Bohemian population
used German as its first and mother tongue.

Landesubliche

Sprache was to the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia the
customary language prevalent in any given district [5].
Robert Kann outlined the two positions this way:
The Czechs held that no distinction existed between
the two concepts in the Crownlands. The Germans
stressed the importance of the distinction • • • •
The Czechs demanded that the Czech language should
on historical grounds be the only official language
throughout the two Crownlands, even in German
districts. The Germans • • • held that the
official language should be only the one customary
in any given district--in the German districts,
German. [6]
The Czechs' demand for their own language to be the only
official language is consistent with Staatsrecht and even
national self-determination, for they considered Bohemia to
be their nation--one nation, one national language
determined by the one national majority.
But here the Gleichberechtigung, or equality of both

,-----
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languages bode just as ill for the Germans as it would have
had Czech indeed been the only official language.

Unable to

gain recognition of the landesubliche Sprache, i.e., German,
as the only official language of their all-German areas, the
Germans began promoting the administrative separation of
Bohemia into a Czech and German part [7].

Such a

separation, they felt, would stem Czech expansion and
thereby render the Language Decrees of 1880 useless.
Time was of the essence for the Germans, for the socalled pure German character in many areas by 1880 already
had ceased to exist.

It became apparent that if German

Kreise were to be established and sealed off from the
Czechs, it must be done as soon as possible.

"It is

estimated that between 1880 and 1900 half a million Czechs
migrated to areas that had been 80% German" [8].
was little indication of this letting up.

And there

(See Appendix,

Map 2.)
POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROGRAMS
The arrival of Prime Minister Taaffe's Iron Ring
coalition sounded the death knell of the Austrian GermanLiberals.

For years there had been bickering within their

ranks chiefly due to divergent opinions as to how they
should deal with the rearrangements of society caused by the
industrial revolution.
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From the Old Liberals, three "socialisms" emerged:
National Socialism, Christian Socialism and the Social
Democrats.
The Christian Socialists fit somewhere between the
conservatism of the church hierarchy and liberal society, a
large area indeed.

Their active voice was Karl Lueger

(1844-1910), who attempted to address the economic
grivenaces of the lower bourgeoisie against business and
industry [9].
The Christian Socialists were center-oriented and were
condemned by the nationalist parties for being too "Slav
friendly" in their attempt to address the nationality
problem.

They, as did the Emperor, eventually became

arbiters in the general search for a Bohemian settlement.
The Social Democrats made their first appearance in
1869 as a manifestation of growing industry.

It was not

until 1889, however, that they had any real power, for it
was only then that they were allowed to meet legally once
the so-called "Anarchy Laws" were dropped [10).
The early leader of the party was Victor Adler, future
Foreign Minister of the First Austrian Republic.

His

position regarding the Czech-German conflict in Bohemia was
simple and reflected the Socialist Weltanschauung in
general:
national.

The conflict was a social class conflict and not
The Social Democrats were "international" as
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opposed to "national" and thus proposed that no national
privileges be accorded anyone.
The doctrine of the Austrian SDP, chiefly the work of
Otto Bauer, Karl Renner and Adler, was consistent with that
of Marx and especially of Engels, who labelled the Germans
as the vanguard in the Socialist struggle in central Europe
and as a bulwark against "Pan-Slavism" from Russia [11).
The Social Democrats did not see eye-to-eye with the
Christian Socialists.

They were, after all, vying for the

hearts and minds of the newly-enfranchised lower-middle
class.

However, there was some room for compromise and

maneuvering between the two parties.

There was no room at

all between the Social Democrats and the third major
political entity to emerge from the German Liberals in late
nineteenth-century Austria--the National Socialists.
The Nationalists represented what in modern jargon
would be considered the right, but not the conservative
right.

That was the territory of the Christian Socialists,

which embraced clerical and moderate monarchist views.

The

National Socialists have been referred to as the "Anti-"
party.

They were anti-Habsburg (the old Liberal

grossdeutsch proponents had found refuge within their
ranks); and anti-Jewish, a characteristic they shared with
the Christian Socialists but not with the Social Democrats,
who had largely a Jewish leadership [12).
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The founder and leader of the National Socialists was
one Georg Schonerer, whom his detractors referred to as
Ritter Georg, an allusion to St. George the Dragonslayer.
He, as did many nationalist leaders, hailed from the Eger
District of German-Bohemia, where the radical National
Socialists drew their strongest support and anti-Czech
feelings were highest.

His followers were " • . • those

Germans whose economic position was most directly threatened
by the Czech migration" [13].

These included not only those

in the mining areas of the German Randgbiet, but often the
middle classes in the cities as well.
Many were disappointed with the internationalism of the
Austrian Social Democrats.

To the displaced German worker,

shopkeeper or bureaucrat the facts were before him:

the

Czechs were not their international brethren, they were
their national adversaries.

The radical arm of the

Nationalists wasted no effort in fanning the fires of this
national antagonism.
There were many factions amongst the Nationalists, as
among the other parties.

Schonerer, Herman Wolf and others

represented the radicals who soon formed their own
association.

In 1885 these radicals formed the extremely

nationalistic anti-Jewish Verband der Deutschnationalen,
which would win them the admiration of Hitler [14].
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THE LINZ PROGRAM
The first officially articulated plan since Kremsier to
address the nationality question was the Linz Program.

It

became the program of Schonerer's pan-Germans in 1895 but
only twelve years after its inception.

Actually, it was the

straw that broke the back of the Liberals and marked their
final dispersal in 1883.

Its authors include none other

than Victor Adler and Georg Schonerer, an unlikely
cooperation, but one which well displays the kneejerk
reaction of all German parties to the sudden ascendancy of
the Czechs during the Taaffe ministry.
The plan " • • • advocated the transfer to Hungary, or
to an autonomous Galicia,

[of]

• • . all Slavs other than

Czechs and Slovenes to make Austria a more German state"
[15).

German again was to become the only official language

throughout the truncated Austria.
German Reich were encouraged.

Closer ties with the

(The Dual Alliance had by 1883

been in effect three years.)
The Linz Group (Schonerer, Adler, Heinrich Friedjung,
Adolf Fishhof) proposed to restore to Austria.
There was a definite grossdeutsch hue to the Linz
Program.

The idea was to "Germanize"

(or re-Germanize)

Austria and promote closer ties to her German cousins to the
west.
The reasons have as much to do with arithmetic than
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with common culture, however.

With the franchise

restrictions moving down and the voting power of the Czechs
moving up, the spectre of Austro-Slavism was beginning to
take on substance.
The democratic forces within Cisleithania, especially
the Socialists, had always promoted electoral reforms in the
direction of an eventual universal sufferage.

This, of

course, would render the Slavs the most powerful race in the
Empire due to their real numbers, but not if the Germans
could effect the severance of nine million Slavs living in
Dalmatia, Galizia, Bukovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

With

the loss of the non-German excess baggage, the Germans could
replace the backfiring curia system with a fair electoral
process with no fear.
The loss of nine million sister Slavs and the
reaffirmation of German centralism and the German language
was, of course, condemned by the Czechs [17].
The significance of the Linz Program is three-fold.
clearly shows that the ethnic concerns outweighed the
political.

That is to say, the commonality of Germanism,

regardless of political leanings, produced this rather
drastic solution to what was collectively perceived as a
Slavic challenge to the leading German position within the
Empire.

It also marks the final break of the republican

side of the Austro-German Liberals.

The Social Democrats

It
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would pursue an internationalism couched, however, in the
firm belief of the German mission, and the National
Socialists would take on a pan-Germanism of the most
chauvinistic hues and eventually adopt the Linz Plan, which
was neither Zweiteilung- nor Staatsrecht-oriented, as their
basic platform.
Most German nationalist parties balked at Schonerer
and his extremists.

The moderate nationalists, Christian

Socialists and Social Democrats eventually disowned
Schonerer and collectively pursue various varieties of the
Zweiteilung approach.
The most significant element of the Linz Plan was that
it " • • • confirmed [for the Czechs] the wisdom of becoming
members of a majority in Vienna sufficiently powerful to
prevent it from being put into practice" [18].
The Czechs of course were not in a position to call all
the shots in Vienna, but they were able to prevent anyone
else from doing so.

This policy of Czech obstructionism

will endure until 1918 and will render parliamentary
legislation on the nationality question virtually
impossible.
1890 SPRACHENVERORDNUNEN
In 1890 a provisional Bohemian settlement was reached
between Taaffe, the Crown and the Old Czechs.

The 1890

i
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Language Decrees called for " • • • the duplication of
administrative machinery in Bohemia in both languages, and
for minority rights in the schools" [19].
Ten years earlier this would have been no small triumph
for the Czechs, but by 1890 the Old Czechs' seats in
Austria's Parliament were diminished by the New Czechs who
were much less conciliatory than their colleagues.

Indeed,

the intransigence of the New Czechs had prevented them from
even being invited to negotiations leading to the 1890
settlement.
The Young Czechs repudiated the settlement as nothing
less than Zweiteilung and condemned the Old Czechs for their
willingness to abandon Staatsrecht and the doctrine of Czech
being the only official Bohemian language.
One sees the beginnings of each nationality containing
two like elements.

The Old Czechs, though waning in power,

and the moderate Germans were able to at least negotiate and
compromise.

The New Czechs, like the National Socialists,

were unshakable, and both respectively promoted the
Czechif ication and Germanization of Bohemia.
After 1890 the Crown " • • • gave up the idea of
reconciliation with Bohemia and may be said to have remained
at least latently anti-Czech for the remainder of his reign"
[ 201 •
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BADENI-SPRACHENVERORDNUNGEN
Taaffe's fall in 1893 was followed by two years of rule
by Grands Seigneurs.

In 1895 Franz Joseph appointed Count

Casimir Badeni to the Premiership in an atmosphere of
intense national conflict within the Empire.
Badeni, as those before him and those who followed, was
charged by the Crown to finally settle the national problem
lest the Empire collapse.

Badeni, as those before him, then

offered, or rather issued, his proposal.

"Count Badeni, by

his Language Ordinances of April 1897, for both Bohemia and
Moravia, unloosed the greatest storm in modern Austrian
politics" [21].
Years of bitter demonstrations followed.
law so universally despised.

Never was any

Clashes in Prague and

especially in Egerland between German and Czech were only
controlled by constantly calling out the police.
notorious 'Baden times'

"In the

[Badeni Zeiten] civil war was

perhaps only narrowly averted" [22].
The most amazing aspect of the whole situation is that
the ordinances themselves were anything but radical.

Indeed,

the greater portion of them had been on the books for over
twenty years [23].

There was a new twist, however.

Badeni

inserted within the decree a mechanism insuring its
enforcement, and this angered German-Bohemians greatly.
Article II dealt with the language qualifications of
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officials.

Section I states:

Officials of the Justice and State Administrations
as well as Ministers of the Interior [Police],
Finance, Commerce and Agriculture placed after June
1, 1905 must prove written and spoken knowledge of
both languages. (24]
To most Czech officials this meant little, for
virtually all were bilingual; to the German officials,
however, this was seen as an outrage.

It was one thing to

provide a translator for a Czech subject in a court of law,
for example.

It was quite another that all the court

officials should learn Czech in order to take their posts-especially in areas totally devoid of Czech inhabitants.
Needless to say this boded well for Czechs seeking a career
in the civil service.
The law was equally unpopular with the Young Czechs
around whom the nation had begun to rally and who, by 1898,
numbered more in both the Reicharat and the Bohemian Diet
than did the Old Czechs.
By 1900 neither accepted the notion of equal rights
within the Crownland borders.

The Germans, with good

reason, feared that Czechs would use the decree to further
encroach into German area.

The only way the Germans would

accept a Gleichberechtingung was by territorial partition.
The Czechs feared that the parity of the languages
would have a centrifugal effect on Bohemia and hinder the
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rebirth of the Bohemian State.

The recognition of two

languages so clearly occupying their own respective areas
was seen by many Czechs as the logical precondition to the
dreaded Zweiteilung of Bohemia.
Both nations challenged the legality of the laws due to
their octroial nature and refused to observe any ruling not
a product of parliamentary legislation.
Dr. Seton-Watson described the scene in the Parliament:
The result was frantic • • • obstructionism in the
Reichsrat. Racial friction degenerated into
fisticuffs on the floor of the House, and there was
keen competition in catcalls and inkpot-throwing.
[25]
Badeni's ordinances were quickly rescinded, though the
"times" bearing his name lasted years.

In 1898 he and his

government fell, to be replaced by Baron Gautsch whose milder
language ordinances satisfied no one and were likewise
withdrawn.
standstill.

The business of Government had come to a virtual
"All serious business had become impossible [in

Parliament] , and government could only be continued by the
constant use of Paragraph Fourteen [imperial decree]" [26],
by an embittered and aging Franz Joseph.
It was in this atmosphere that deputies from all German
parties, except Sch6nerers' "Linzers," began to grasp
Zweiteilung as their only hope to maintain the cultural
integrity of Deutschboehmen, while the Czechs became deeper
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entrenched in the Staatsrecht idea.
The National Socialists and the Badeni-Crown having
tried and failed, it was now turn for the somewhat more
conciliatory groups to try their hand at breaking the
deadlock.
THE BRUNN PROGRAM
In light of the situation mentioned above, Socialist
leaders felt that a common German political front was
necessary if a solution was to be found to the Empire's
nationality problems.
Meeting at Brunn in 1899 the Social Democrats drafted a
resolution aimed at findng a compromise with the various
Socialist factions in Austria [27].
The Austrian Social Democrats as well as the Christian
Socialists and National Socialists however never wavered
from the idea of the German Herrenvolk in Central Europe
[ 2 8] •

Adolf Fishhof, one of the principal drafters of the
Brunn Program, " • • • consistently urged the maintenance of
this German leadership through the preservation of the
Empire • • • " [29].

He went on to say, however, that

concessions to non-Germans must be made in order to
strengthen that leadership [30].
Fishhof, Karl Kavski, Friederich Austerlitz and others
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saw the whole national struggle in the Marxist doctrinaire
view of
• • • serving the interests of the ruling class in
an attempt to hinder social progress.
[Thus] • • •
the regulating of the nationality question within
an equal rights framework was in the best interest
of the advancement of the proletarian culture. [31]
The Brunn Program, therefore, was the establishment of
equal national entities in a democratic federation of
nations.
Points 2, 3, and 4 of the final draft give its basic
character:
2.
In place of historic crownlands • • •
ethnically determined autonomous bodies should be
created. Their legislative and administrative
agencies • • • elected by national chambers on the
basis of general, equal and direct franchise.
3. All autonomous territories of one nationality
should combine to form a nationally homogeneous
association, which should have complete selfadministration in national affairs.
4. The rights of national minorities should be
protected by a separate law to be passed by central
parliament.
[ 3 2]
Point 5 deals with the temporary designation of German
as the language of mediation, but even the most conciliatory
Czech saw the danger and rejected it.
The Brunn Program was a scheme for solving the national
problems through a complicated system of cultural autonomy
based not on territorial units, but on the communities of
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languages.

It was designed to fit the intermingling and

overlapping of nations and languages within the Empire,
especially Bohemia and Moravia.
Simply put it was Zweiteilung, something the Czechs
would not have, but it goes even deeper than that.

Point 2

explains the complete rejection of politico-historical
borders, the very soul of Czech demands.

Not only in

Bohemia but throughout the empire the marriage of people to
traditional boundaries was too strong to be dissolved.
Point 4 was rather open-ended and did not really
address the issue of the mixed areas where social tension
was highest.
If the Brunn Program seems revolutionary yet familiar,
it is because it is virtually identical to Palacky's
proposal at Kremsier during the Revolution of 1848-9.
It is noteworthy that the concept of "Austria" has endured.
From Palacky to most Czechs in Parliament in 1918 the belief
in a strong cohesive empire persisted.
The Social Democrats' proposal was little more than an
official articulation of German concern over Czech expansion
couched in the dogma of Marxism and emotional nationalism.
Clearly the "autonomous territories of one nationality" were
collections of Bezirke to form Kreise, and the "national
homogeneous association" refers to the collection of five
or six Kreise which would form the autonomous territory of
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German-Bohemia comprising nearly half of the entire Bohemian
territory and population.
[The] historical significance [of Brunn] lies in
its symptomatic content.
It shows just how deep
opposition [to Staatsrecht] had gone [on the German
side] and how far Czech nationalism had seeped into
all levels of Czech Society so that any compromise
(between Czech and German] became less and less
likely.
[33]
The idea of an empire of nationalities replacing
nations was indeed revolutionary, perhaps too much so [34].
The inability to recognize that the Czechs were not the only
ones to place a premium on historic borders within the
Empire is reflected by the universal rejection of the Brunn
Program in 1900.

It also caused a rift among German and

Czech members of the so-called "international" Austrian
Social Democrats that would result in the creation of a
Czech Social Democratic Party five years later which would
reject Brunn and uphold Staatsrecht.
It is to the Brunn Program's credit, however, that
though it was rejected, most German parties embraced many of
its integral principals in their own programs.

The cry for

national self-determination amongst the German-Bohemians
was, of course, the most obvious.
THE WHITSUNTIDE PROGRAM
This program appeared on the scene in June 1899, just
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about the same time as did the Brunn Program.

Neither

anticipated the other, but both articulated the prevailing
moods of turn of the century Austria.
This program was the product of the so-called German
opposition parties in Parliament and included the German
People's Party, German Progressive Party, Union of
Constitutional Landowners, Christian Social Union and the
Free-German Union.

Whitsuntide reflected the German

nationalism of the more radical Linz Program insomuch as it
too advocated the severance of the excess Slavic baggage of
Galicea, Herzegovina, etc. in order to give Germans a
numerical preeminance in Cisleithania.

Although far from

advocating an Anschluss with the German Reich, it did praise
the already twenty year-old alliance with Germany and
promoted even closer ties in education and commerce [35].
With regard to the non-German population of the Empire,
the Whitsuntide Program was much more conciliatory than
Linz.

Indeed, the Linz Program wished simply to swallow up

the non-Germans, while the Whitsuntide group advocated
extending equal rights to all nationalities--but only after
the administrative separation from one another, a kind of
separate but equal approach.

This, of course, reflects the

attitude embraced at Brunn but without the universally
condemned notion of the dissolution of all historic borders.
In short, Whitsuntide advocated the maintenance of the
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old Crownland borders (as per Staatsrecht) with national
Abgrenzung, or delimitations, within them.
The programs' general demands regarding Bohemia are
outlined as follows:
III.

Special Fundamental Laws for Individual
Countries.
B.

Bohemia.

1. National Delimitation. The national
[ethnographic] delimitations of the Bezirke which
will emanate from the towns is to be carried out.
Bezirke are to contain only villages and towns of
one and the same nationality. The delimited
Bezirke shall be the building blocks of nationally
separated administrative areas [Kreisel which shall
have their own electoral precincts [Wahlgezirke,
usually comprised of three or four Bezirke] for the
Bohemian Diet, Imperial Parliament and other
representative bodies.
The delimitation of the German and Czech
parts of Bohemia • • • will result in each living
within their own Stamm, or core areas.
[36]
The Whitsuntide Program also touched upon the most
sensitive areas of German-Czech conflict:

"In mixed areas,

whether Gemeinde [community], Bezirk or Kreis, both
languages have parity [and]

• • • in all mixed areas schools

for minorities are to be built" [37] •
On the surface the Whitsuntide Program does not seem
wholly unfair.

It was, of course, a defensive tactic

against the "Czechification" of German Bohemian territory,
but it was ready to recognize the Czechs as equal partners
in their common homeland.

It would seem that any Czech
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rejection of such a plan would reveal the true identity of
the Czech national aspirations--not equality but dominance
in Bohemia.

Many saw Whitsuntide as an olive branch held

out to the Czechs, the rejection of which would render the
conciliatory Germans as the unjustly injured party.

The

truth, however, is that the program of the German opposition
was anything but fair.

Interwoven in its content were its

selfish motives and its undiminished racial chauvinism.
The main problem revolved around the mixed areas--not
the individual rights within them, but exactly which areas
were to be considered mixed.

The following exposes a rank

double standard employed by the Germans in their designation
of the national character of a given area.
In the German mining towns where many Czechs worked,
the entire family would be counted as "German" due to a
system of census-taking that endured until the last Austrian
census of 1910.

People were counted and nationally

designated according to their language of everyday use or
Umgangssprache.

If a Czech was employed at a German firm

he, of course, would speak German on the job and thus was
counted as a German.

Subsequently, as head of the

household, his entire family would be entered on the census
rolls as Germans regardless of their origin or what language
they spoke at home.

Many Czechs argued that instead of the

Umgangssprache, the hearth language or the language spoken
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at home, should be the method of determining nationality,
but the Germans would have no part of it [38].
The inverse of this practice is displayed in number
three of the Special Laws for Bohemia in the Whitsuntide
Program:

"In mixed areas, such as the Capital at Prague, a

parity of both languages shall exist" [39].
Prague was no random example.

The mention of

"Most Germans believed they

had a legitimate claim to Prague and refused to make any
concessions to the Czechs who demanded the denial of such a
claim" [40].

Some Germans explained the claim as being

consistent with Staatsrecht and felt that the common capital
would help to maintain the unity of Bohemia.

Few Czechs

were willing to believe that was their intention.
Though the Germans still held control of the Bohemian
Diet in Prague--if only by obstructionism--they really
represented a mere 5% of the capital's 202,000 citizens in
1900 [41].

Beyond that, nearly 40% of those were Jews

claiming German nationality [42].

(Jews were obliged to

claim either Czech or German nationality.)

Many such

Jewish-Germans were prominant bankers and newspapermen and
actually disclaimed as Germans by German nationalists.
There were proportionately many more Czechs in Vienna than
Germans in Prague.

The Germans were in effect manipulating

demographics to their own advantage.

They were

exaggerating their presence in Prague, while often unwilling

61
to even acknowledge the Czech presence in predominately
German areas.
In this light the Whitsuntide Plan is revealed as a
product of the Herrenvolk concept.

The Germans sought the

dual advantage of maintaining the national character of the
German areas and at the same time remaining at the helm of
the Bohemian political ship of state.

The idea of the

Germans claiming two-fifths of Bohemia and parity in what
one would assume would be the Czech capital was, of course,
abhorrant to the Czechs--even to the last vestiges of the
more conciliary Old Czechs.
The government, though unwilling to meet the demand of
Zweiteilung, did reveal a growing tendency to accommodate the
Germans over the radicalizing Czechs, which lasted until
World War I.
[In] 1899, the aggressive German national
Whitsuntide program was issued, and the new Clary
cabinet obligingly met its demands to the extent of
restoring the language regulations as they had
existed [in] • • • 1880.
[43)
THE KORBER PLAN
The last attempt before the war to reach an accord in
Bohemia was presented by Premier Ernst von Korber in 1903.
Korber enjoyed respect from both sides of the aisle in the
Reichsrat.

Under his premiership from 1900 to 1904 there

was renewed confidence in the machinery of Parliament.

The
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excessive use of Paragraph 14 was curtailed; social reforms
were initiated, and new commercial agreements with Hungary
were made which Korber's predecessors had failed to procure.
Dr. Seton-Watson refers to Korber as " • • • the most
remarkable of Austria's modern Premiers, indeed almost the
only one of outstanding merit"

[44).

But, alas, relations between Czech and German leaders
had by this time deteriorated to such a degree that even a
government in such capable hands failed to dislodge the
intense intransigence now exercised by Germans and Czechs
alike.
What Korber proposed was not Zweiteilung but
Dreiteitung.

He attempted to isolate the mixed areas, that

is, those areas where the general Czech population
geographically met the general German population.

Korber

hoped that by removing the mixed areas from both Czech and
German spheres much tension between the two nationalities
could be avoided.

This third part of Bohemia would then be

self-governing under the auspices of Vienna.
The Korber Program was not unlike the Whitsuntide
program in its mechanics, the third division
notwithstanding, but it did not carry with it the stridently
pro-German attitude of the latter which actually included on
the issued draft its own necessity as:

"Due to the

systematic repression and the ever increasing threat to the
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German race in Austria • • • " [45].

Korber's plan was based

on simply reaching a settlement between the two
nationalities, not the defense of one against the threat of
another, as was embodied in former proposals.
The Plan was as good as any other.

As a matter of

fact, it was still a viable consideration in 1914.

But to

merely separate the nationally mixed areas from the
basically homogeneous areas did not eliminate strife, only
isolated it.

Just as no one could agree where the ethnic

borders should be between the Czechs and Germans in the
Zweiteilung form, no one could agree where they should be
drawn between, say, German and mixed.
Had the borders actually been fixed, one could assume
that the mixed areas themselves would merely have become
microcosms of the conflict in general.
THE MORAVIAN COMPROMISE
The one single success in pre-War Cisleithania was a
settlement in Bohemia's sister Crownland, Moravia.

The

Moravian Compromise of 1906 was the result of simply
allowing both nationalities their own fixed seats in the
Diet at Brunn.
nationality.

A citizen voted according to his registered
A German could only vote for a German to take

a German seat; likewise a Czech.

The fixed number of Diet

seats for each nationality resulted in eliminating
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competition between the latter.

The system was hardly a

paradigm of democracy, however.

The settlement greatly

favored the Germans who represented only 28% of the
population of Moravia in 1900 [46].
The Crownland Diet at Brunn sat a ratio of 73 Czechs to
40 Germans--grossly out of proportion to the population.
The curia system survived based on the old estates system.
The town Curia was equally divided, but in the country Curia
(Grossgrundbesitzern) the Germans held about half the seats,
although the actual population was 90% Czech [47].

A fifth

universal suffrage Curia was added based on nationality,
but it could elect only twenty of the 151 seats at Brunn.
The fact that the so-called "Personal System"
functioned with little difficulty for ten years shows more
the glaring difference between Moravia and Bohemia than it
does any merit in the system itself.

Such a system as

employed in Moravia could never have worked in Bohemia, for
the historic national tarditions in Moravia were not as
strong as those in Bohemia.

Moravia had preserved her

clerical conservative tenant-landlord ties and remained
almost fuedal in character [48].
Therefore, the feudal landlord-tenant relationship
endured in Moravia; it embraced an often clerical
conservatism and spurned the nationalist intelligencia which
was so successful in Moravia's more cosmopolitan sister to
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the west.
It was, however, a settlement--something achieved
precious seldom in pre-War Austria.

It is to its credit

that the "Personal System" was extended to Bukovina in 1910
where, as in Moravia, it lasted until the collapse of the
empire.
Naturally the Crown was pleased; the Germans in Moravia
were pleased but the Czech nationalist leaders, such as Dr.
Karel Kramar, leader of the Young Czechs, were highly
disturbed.

Not only was Moravia going her own way by

refuting the sacred solidarity of the indivisibility of the
Crownlands but internally she had willingly put herself in
the pocket of the ruling Germans under the thinnest of
democratic pretexts.
GERMAN-CZECH POLITICAL POSITION BEFORE 1914
The first decade of the twentieth century saw a
settlement in Moravia, the abolition of the Curia system for
both houses of Parliament (although the Curia remained at
the Diet level), followed by the introduction of universal
manhood suffrage in time for the 1907 elections, though real
strength remained with the Crown.
The elections returned the German Social Democrats as
the single largest party in Parliament but without an
absolute majority, thus rendering Parliament still dependent
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upon coalitions to get anything through.
The Union of the Czechs now held more seats than the
German Nationalist Union (Whitsuntide advocates).

The

Christian Socialists absorbed the Clerics to become the
largest group, holding 94 seats.

But the Socialists who

alone held 84 had in one year jumped from only ten.

The Old

Feudal Landlord Constitutionalists Conservatives' Union
(signators to Whitsuntide) disappeared entirely.
The new Parliament realigned within itself in an
attempt to adapt to the new centers of political power.
Consequently there were divisions among divisions, which
represented every political hue.

"In total there were 28

factions, a truly representative picture of the national and
political diversity in current Cisleithania" [49].
There then began a spirit of mutual cooperation between
Slavs who, now that the Curias were dissolved, were the most
numerous race in Parliament.

The solidarity of all Slavs in

Vienna was, on the whole, ineffective.

One must remember

that the Crown still was in ultimate control.
• • • though there [now] was a democratic
parliament, there was no parliamentary government.
The ministers received their posts from and were
instructed by the Crown and were not responsible to
Parliament.
[50]
Though Parliament was radically democratized, it was still
as weak as ever before the Crown.

l
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The elections of 1911, the last of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, again returned the Socialists as the largest single
party.

Due to a return to pessimism brought on by the

universal disapproval of the continued ineffectiveness of
government regarding the nationality problems, the German
political middle collapsed and split its alliance between
the Nationalist Socialists and the Social Democrats, causing
a polarization of power in Austrian politics in general.
The Czechs abandoned the Germansim of the Austrian
Social Democrats in 1905 and formed their own party which
rejected the Zweiteilung of Brunn and joined in the allCzech ranks of Staatsrecht.

The Czech political parties

came under the leadership of Thomas G. Masaryk, who founded
the Realist Party in 1900, and Karel Kramar, who headed up
the Young Czechs.
Masaryk spurned the overtly racial overtones of
"Slavism" and instead embraced the Western rationalist
philosophies of Locke and Hume.

He saw for the future Czech

state a kind of liberal democracy along the lines of that in
the United States.

Masaryk and his closest collaborator and

student Eduard Benes were to be the first among the few who
visualized a Czechoslovakia completely independent of
Vienna.

One must remember that those who longed for the

resurrection of a Czech state never considered that it would
not belong to an Austrian federation centered in Vienna.
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Masaryk's Realist Party never returned more than three seats
in the Reichsrat [51].

He was, however, very much respected

by his colleagues and counterparts.
Unlike Masaryk, Karel Kramar looked to the East for
Czech salvation.

His abiding belief in the pan-Slavic

movement actually foresaw the possibility of a Russian Grand
Duke wearing the crown of St. Wenceslas and continued to do
so until the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 whereupon he
joined the "Westerners."

He was looked upon by the Habsburg

Crown as a rebel, and his Young Czechs were regarded as
revolutionaries.

Franz Joseph referred to the Young Czech

victory in the 1898 elections where they returned more seats
than their older more conservative Old Czech colleagues as
an example of the stupidity of the voting peasants and an
indication of the revolutionary aims of the Young Czech
leaders [52].

The disdain the Viennese government had for

Kramar would become more apparent during the war with the
military clique in charge.
Masaryk's Realists were allied with the new Czech
Social Democrats who, by 1907, were the largest single Czech
political party, with Kramar's Young Czechs close behind.
Masaryk and Bene~ during the first decade of the new
century both held that Zweiteilung may indeed be the
Bohemian answer and that Staatsrecht was of dubious merit-rather curious convictions coming from the future President
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and Foreign Minister of the future independent Czechoslovak
Republic.
• • • there arose individual voices from the Czech
camp that were nearer • • • to the German point of
view.
[Bene~] • . • saw the Zweiteilung as not so
bad and, in contrast to the Czech party's
standpoint vis-a-vis the Kreise Abgnenzung, [he]
saw the basis for a solution to the national
question.
[S3]
Dr. Bene~' opinion was published in 1908 in Le Proplem
Autrichien et la Question Tcheque, in which he states:
Certainly the struggle could never be completely
avoided but by Zweiteilung many causes of strife
could. The state [Austria] would leave the
problems • • • to the individual national
territories • • • and would insure only law and
order. • • •
[Each] nationality would •
develop its own resources, and the state would
favor none over the other.
[S4]
As for the concept of Staatsrecht he goes on to say in the
above-mentioned work,
It responds excellently to the wishes and dreams of
the Czechs but has little practical and realistic
value. • • • One cannot seriously think of
establishing a Czech state if one-third of the
population [Germans] is ready to fight with all
means.
[SS]
Bene~

was obviously much influenced by his mentor, Masaryk,

who felt that the Czech cause did not rest on the principle
of Staatsrecht but simply on the notion of free people
living as equal Austrians [S6].

The most important point

,---~--
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Masar§k makes here is the "equal nationalities" idea, for it
does not necessarily mean "national autonomy."
Masaryk's position approached the German demands for
national separation and thus offered a compromise, asking
for recognition of the bilingual character of all public
agencies in Bohemia but not demanding that officials have a
command of both languages [57].
It was just that "bilingual character" that Germans saw
as the greatest threat to the unilingual character of their
German areas.

Masar~k's watered down "Badeni Laws" had no

appeal whatsoever to the zweiteilung proponents.

What good

would Zweiteilung be if that which Zweiteilung was devised
to thwart was allowed to go on unabated--namely the
bilingualism and Czech incursion from which the Germans
wished to isolate themselves?
Negotiations between those Czechs and Germans who were
still willing to hope for a solution had been reduced to a
game of first moves.

That is, the Czechs were willing to

discuss national partition of Bohemia only after language
laws allowing both languages equal footing throughout all
Bohemia had been accepted--these, in essence, were Masaryk's
terms.

The Germans demanded the administrative partition

first which, of course, would render such language laws
superfluous, for the autonomous nature of the German areas
would simply, and legally, close their borders to Czech
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immigrants and parity of the Czech language [58].
Among the Germans was an Imperial deputy from Aussig in
North Bohemia, who, for the same reasons as Masaryk and
Benes, bears mentioning.

Deputy Dr. Rudolf Ritter Lodgman

von Auel was a member of the German Progressive Party, one
of the German opposition parties.

Lodgman, however,

rejected Zweiteilung and refused to fix his name on the
Whitsuntide Plan which many Progressives endorsed.
He was of the opinion that the Czech settlements in
the German areas, based as [they were] on
overwhelming economic necessity, would not be
stymied by Gebietsabgrenzung.
[59]
Lodgman, who spoke Czech without an accent and was in
closer touch with Slav feelings than his colleagues [60],
believed the "Personal Principle" of the Moravian Compromise
much more acceptable than territorial delimitation.
Ironically, just as Masaryk and Bene~ did not object to
Zweiteilung but would later become the personification of
Staatsrecht, Lodgman, who opposed Zweiteiling, was to become
governor of the German-Bohemian Autonomous Province in late
1918 and thus the very personification of Zweiteilung.
WAR
In December 1914, shortly before his departure to go
abroad for the duration of the war, Dr Masaryk had a
conversation with his friend, former Prime Minister Dr.
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Ernst von Korber.

The following dialogue shows the new

Czech-German relation war had created.
Masaryk:
If Austria wins, will Vienna be capable
of carrying out the necessary reforms?
Korber (decidedly): No! Victory would strengthen
the old system, and a new system under the young
• • • Archduke Charles • • • , would be no better
than the old. The soldiers would have the upper
hand • • • and they would centralize and Germanize.
It would be absolutism with parliamentary
embellishments.
Masaryk: Will Germany be wise enough to make her
ally adopt reforms?
Korber:

Hardly.

[61]

Bene§ and Masaryk now wholeheartedly supported the
maintenance of the historic borders of Staatsrecht with the
added claim to Slovakia.

Not even Palacky had claimed both,

and Masaryk's contradictory demands of the lands of St.
Wenceslas plus the Hungarian region of Slovakia, which had
never belonged to the Bohemian kingdom, would result in later
criticism.

Bene~

and Masaryk further rejected federalism

and embraced complete independence.
As for what Masaryk envisioned for the Germans of
Bohemia, he had by April 1915 stated,
It may seem to be a paradox, but it is only on the
principle of nationality that we wish to retain our
German minority • • • [for] in no country are two
nationalities so intermixed and interwoven as in
Bohemia.
[62]

---1
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This is, of course, not entirely true.

Mixed areas did

indeed exist but the overwhelming majority of German
territory was at least 90% German (63], even by later
Czechoslovak accounts.
Kram~I, who still looked to the East,

" • • . was

content to wait passively until the tramp of Cossack hoofs
should sound on the streets • • • of Prague itself" (63].
Kramar, as did other more radical Czech leaders who
remained in the Empire, had little choice of action.

He did

not have the luxury of espousing such dangerous ideas as
those in self-exile in Paris, London and later Washington,
D.C.

(Benes et al)

(64].

There were many like Kramar who believed in the
legendary "Russian Steamroller" which, of course, never
came.

Instead, the first two years of war were marked by

substantial victories for the Central Powers.

This had a

great effect on German Nationalists, especially in Bohemia,
where warring Austria found her most avid patriots.
The victories in the East brought on a heady aura of
confidence that played into the militant radical Germans'
hands.

About this time Friedrich Naumann's book,

Mitteleuropa, appeared; it advocated the establishment of a
German-controlled Central Europe from the Baltic to
Bulgaria.

"Mid-Europe will have a German nucleus, will

voluntarily [!] use the German language, which • • • is
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already the language of intercourse of Central Europe" [65].
It was the resuscitation of the old grossdeutsch idea as
embodied in the Linz Program of 1883.
The combination of military victories, Naumann's book
and the activities of certain Czech leaders (Kram~r and
others had been tried for treason and were awaiting
execution in 1915) brought forth an opinion that a
settlement of the nationality problem in Bohemia need not
necessarily be in agreement with the Czechs.

More and more

the idea was pushed to the front that the problem should be
solved by a decree from above favoring, of course, the
German position [66].
The upshot was the notorious Easter Demands of 1916,
signed by individuals of all Austro-German political
parties.

Lodgmann, who was making headway in the direction

of a settlement based on the "Personal System," refused to
sign the Demands.

If he felt the Whitsuntide Plan to be

radical, he certainly would not fix his name on a
resuscitated Linz Plan.
All the old demands were there:

German as state

language, separation of Galicia and " • • •

[the] insistence

on the legal recognition of German political, cultural and
racial superiority" (67].
The old Emperor naturally refused to sign what was
tantamount to an abrogation of the 1867 constitution, which
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gave, albeit unspecified, guarantees of equality to all
nationalities.

Neither would his heir, Emperor Karl I, who

donned the imperial crown in December 1916, after FranzJoseph finally passed on.
The actual situation for Czechs in Bohemia was not so
very different from that proposed by the Easter Demands.
Public meetings were banned; the Sokols were outlawed by
military officials; and by 1917, 20,000 citizens had been
arrested, including businessmen and political leaders no
longer enjoying parliamentary immunity (the Reichsrat had
been closed since the outbreak).

"Until the change of

regime which followed the death of Francis Joseph, the
Czechs were as completely muzzled as any people in Europe"
[ 6 8] •

With the arrival of Karl to the throne, momentous
developments occurred.

Aware of the deepening resentment in

Bohemia as elsewhere, Karl took on a mantle of appeasement,
both at home and abroad.

He reconvened the Reichsrat in May

1917 and appointed Dr. Ernst von Seidler, a Social Democrat,
to the Premiership.

Karl gave amnesty to Kramar and others

who returned to Prague to a hero's welcome.

He put out

peace feelers toward France through his brother-in-law,
Prince Sixtus of Parma, the disclosure of which prompted
Wilhelm II to demand reaffirmation of Austro-Hungarian
loyalty to the Dual Alliance [68].
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The opening of Parliament on May 30, 1917, saw the
return of a very confident and outspoken Czech leadership,
especially since Bohemia had become a virtual Czech
interment camp.
Only a week earlier 150 prominent Czech leaders in
politics, business, education and the press had drafted the
Manifesto of the Czech Parliamentary Club.

It " • • •

demanded a federal state of free and equal national states
and the union of all Czechs and Slovaks" (70].

This brazen

official demand for Slovakia followed close on the heels of
the French reply to President Wilson's request for an
articulation of Allied war aims.

The French government's

response included " • • • the liberation of Italians, of
Slavs, of Roumainians [sic] and of Czecho Slovaks from
foreign domination"

(71].

Bene~

and other Czech exiles in

Paris were doing good work.
With the inclusion of Slovakia the German nationalists
correctly felt that Czech demands now rested upon a
contradictory basis of historic rights in their claims to
all Bohemia and national self-determination in their claims
to Slovakia.

If logically applied, the latter should leave

the German-Bohemians free to unite with Austria--or even
Germany.

The former, though certianly allowing the Czechs

to claim German-Bohemia, would not allow claims to Slovakia.
The Czechs were accused of wanting it both ways while not
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granting either way to the Germans [72].
The manifesto was defeated all down the non-Czech line.
To the Hungarians it was tantamount to a declaration of war
[73].

Seidler's proclamation of a federalized Austria,

which was merely an updated version of the Brunn Plan, was
also rejected.

Parliament proved no more effective than it

had been before the war.
There was one difference however.

Parliament provided

a forum for the discontentment of the various nationalities
in the Empire as before 1914, but now the Allies too were
listening.

They were beginning to understand the potential

value in the exploitation of national grievances.
Understanding the potential value of friends in the
Entente camp, the Czechs missed no opportunity to let their
views be known in Parliament.

This "talking through the

window" was chiefly for the benefit of the outside world in
general.

They wanted the Entente to know that a potential

ally awaited within the confines of the Austro-Hungarian
empire.

This also afforded a way of talking to their

kinsmen in exile (74].

By late 1917 the Czech kinsmen were

talking back.
Eduard Bene~ sent word from his Paris-based
Czechoslovak National Committee that the time was right for
a general statement emanating not from the floor of
Parliament but from Prague itself.
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Therefore, on January 6, 1918, through

Bene~'

prompting, " • • • writers, all the Czech delegates of the
Reichsrat and the Diets of the Bohemian Crown

• "

[75]

convoked at Prague a convention which drafted the so-called
"Epiphany Manifesto."
Besides the fact that it came from Prague and that
"Czechoslovakia" be allowed to attend the peace conference,
there was nothing really new in its demands.

Incidentally

the Czechs at home were still proposing a Czechoslovakia
within an Austrian Empire.

Their actions were provocative,

but not seditious.
The significance of the Manifesto is not so much its
content nor even its intention, but the response it
solicited from the German-Bohemians who were prompted to
their strongest action to date.
Prior to 1918 there had been some talk of enacting an
autonomous German-Bohemian Province answerable to Vienna but
having nothing to do with Prague.

By mid-January 1918 it

had become audible from German Bohemian delegates in
general.

First they condemned the present Ministry of

Seidler when they announced to the press
• • • that the United German Bohemian Deputies
[excluding Social Democrats] were going into
opposition to the Seidler cabinet. They further
announced that they no longer have confidence in
Dr. Seidler and the Ministerium due to their
wavering and weakness in regards to the Czechs.

[76]
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They ended with an attack on the government that every
household in the agriculturally poor German areas could
understand.

[Our actions are]

" • • • also due to the

ongoing economic crisis and the government's failure to keep
promises to procure much needed coal and food stuffs" [77].
The fuel and food shortages in German Bohemia, as in
Vienna, were bad in 1917.
was critical.

By January 1918, the situation

The fact that the Czech-inhabited Central

Plain was relatively well off resulted in accusations of
hoarding, which only increased tensions.
One week after declaring their parliamentary opposition
to Seidler, the United German-Bohemians published their own
declaration of "German-Bohemian Staatsrecht."

The very use

of the sacred Czech motto indicates a real desire to fight
back with language equal to that of the Czechs.
The salient points of the Staatsrechtlichen Deklaration
der Deutschbohmischen Abgeordneten are as follows:
In these times of troubles the revolutionary Czechs
seek to exploit the situation, smash the Empire and
place 3.5 million Germans under the yoke of a
Bohemian Slav State.
[For these reasons the] • • •
people of Deutschbohmen demand the establishment of
an autonomous Deutschbohmischen Provinz with all
rights and privileges of a Crownland within
Imperial Austria and with no ties to the Czech part
of Bohemia what-so-ever.
[In addition to their]
• • • right to live free of Czech bondage, [they
also declared] • • • that we no longer recognize
the Provincial Diet of • • • Bohemia [at Prague].
[78]

80
This represents a marked change in the German attitude
toward their role in Bohemia.

The Whitsuntide Plan

advocated control of the Prague Diet, while now the German
wished no connection to it at all.

It would appear that the

Germans of Bohemia were tacitly recognizing the autonomous
position of the Czechs so as to have their own position
recognized as the same.

They also demanded the formation of

German Kreise within which schools, official language, etc.,
would be entirely controlled by the Germans.
The borders of these individual German Kreise,
according to Radical German Party leader Dr. Raphael Pacher,
chief draftsman of the declaration, already existed along
the constituency borders drawn for the Reichsrat elections
of 1907 [79].
And so by February 1918, both Bohemians, Czechs and
Germans had each presented their claims before the official
forum in Vienna, such as it was.
FOREIGN INTERVENTION
Meanwhile, though the Czechoslovak National Council in
Paris was recognized as a belligerant ally, French, British
and American administrations were shying away from any
commitment of recognition of the proposed borders of the
future state.

Indeed, the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian

Empire was initially rejected as an allied war aim.

The

-----i
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rights of oppressed peoples was one thing; the destruction
of Central European unity was quite another.
In February 1917, the U.S. Secretary of State directed
his Ambassador to the Court of St. James to inform the
British government of President Wilson's desire to keep
Austria-Hungary intact.
The President believes • • • that were it possible
for him to give the necessary assurances to the
government of Austria, which fears radical
dismemberment, he could force the acceptance of [a
separate] peace.
[80]
Great Britain and France were vacillating, however.

In

Mr. Balfour's address to the Imperial Council on Foreign
Policy of May 1917, he stated, "As regards Bohemia •
[which] has a hatred of German civilization

...

,"

apparently not realizing that two-fifths of Bohemians were
Germans, " • • • whether

all these feelings could not

be satisfied by giving Bohemia some sort of autonomy in the
Empire I am not so sure" (87].
It was not until the spring of 1918 and the failure of
a separate peace that the U.S. and Entente Powers began
recognizing the individual national councils as de facto
representatives of future states and that the AustroHungarian Empire must perish.
The joint support extended by the West to the Congress
of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary held in Rome in April
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1918 reveals that commitment.

The American Secretary of

State said that the proceedings were followed with great
interest " • • • and that the nationalistic aspirations of
the Czecho-Slovaks • • • for freedom have the earnest
sympathy of this Governemnt" [82].
A few days later Italy, France and Great Britain sent
notification of Allied solidarity:
The Allied Governments take note with satisfaction
of the declarations by the Secretary of State • • •
and desire to associate themselves with it in
expressing • • • sympathy for the national
aspirations • • • of the Czechoslovak • • • nation.
[83]
Now, sympathies and support were all very fine, but they
were not enough.
The aim of the Czech policy was to obtain from the
Allies a definite promise that they would establish
an independent Czechoslovak state, [but most
importantly] • • • within the frontiers stipulated
by Masaryk.
[84]

Of course,

Bene~

required that the boundaries " • • • not be

drawn according to the principles of nationality" [85].
Such action would leave the future state with no more
territory than the Bohemian Germans were willing to concede.
Such requirements were met on June 23, 1918, when
French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon handed Bene~ a note
which stated that France would
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• • • recognize • • • officially the National
council as the supreme organ • • • of the
Czechoslovak Government. The historic rights of a
nation cannot be destroyed • • • and at the proper
time [the Government of the Republic of France]
will endeavor • • • to secure your aspirations to
independence within the historical boundaries of
your provinces.
[86]
Prime Minister Lloyd-George and President Wilson were
unwilling to commit themselves to any territorial promises
to the Czechoslovak National Council, stating instead that
territorial delimitations were to be settled at the Peace
Conference--the invitation to which was extended to the
Czechoslovak National Council.
Missives of Secretary of State Lansing to President
Wilson clearly show the legal and official posture the
Americans wished to assume--a position Benes would
eventually play against that of France.
I do not think it wise to give full recognition to
the Czecho-Slovaks as a sovereign nation. • • .
I
think [a] declaration would have to contain a
reservation as to territorial limits.
[87]
Wilson heeded Lansing's advice and worked out a plan to
recognize the Council based on its Allied war efforts only
and not on Czechoslovak territorial claims.
The President then sent to Lansing's desk the following
draft which was passed to the Czechoslovak National Council:
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The Government of the United States • • •
recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a

de facto belligerent clothed with proper authority
to direct the military and political affairs of
[the same] •
[ 8 8]
Wilson noted on the margin that he felt that Lansing
had

II

successfully stated both the actual facts and

the new legal relationship which we assume • • • W.W." [89].
Therefore

Bene~

only from France.

could procure the territorial blessings

Great Britain and the U.S. held steadfast

to the idea of nothing being decided until a peace
conference could be convened.

Thus, two divergent

interpretations emerged of what the map of Europe looked
like in mid-1918.

Wilson and Lloyd-George recognized the

continuation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until such time
as the peace conference dismantled it.

Clemen~eau,

on the

other hand, saw her as already in pieces.
COLLAPSE
While Bene~ and Masaryk were consolidating the Czech
position in the Allied camp during the summer of 1918, the
machinery of the Austro-Hungarian government was plodding
along--if only by inertia.
In Bohemia, the German Nationalists, if no longer so
sure of a Central Power victory, were ever confident that
the establishment of their autonomous province was just
around the corner--national self-determination having become
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the catch word of victor and vanquished alike based on
Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 1918.
This German-Bohemian confidence was evidenced in the
press which reported the daily debates of Parliament in
Vienna.
Five months after the German-Bohemian declaration of
their own Staatsrecht, the leading Bohemian newspaper ran
this story on the front page:
Informed circles indicate the order for the
Einkreisung [formation of homogenous Kreisel
imminent. • • • Preparations have advanced though
not complete, especially concerning the national
demarcations of Pilsen and Budweis.
(90]
Both Pilsen and Budweis, long controlled by a German
municipal adminstration, were among those cities "lost" to
the Czechs during the migration of the last years of the
previous century.

In truth there never was a German

majority in either city, and by the 1921 census both showed
less than 18% German (91].
The article went on to list the six German Kreise which
were to be erected along Bohemia's borders with Prussia,
Saxony, Bavaria and Upper and Lower Austria:

Eger to the

extreme west and stronghold of the most avid nationalists;
Reichenberg to the north where the provincial capital of the
same name was to be located; Leitmeritz, which encompasses
the Erzgebirge rich with lignite deposits and runs along
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northwest Bohemia between Eger and Reichenberg; German
Pilsen in the central west; German Budweis in the south, and
Trautenau along northeast Bohemia, which encompasses the
mineral-rich Sudeten Mountains.

(See Appendix, Map 3.)

Czech Bohemia was divided up into nine Kreise, which
clustered in the center of the country.

Two days later the

headlines asked:
When will the Kreiseinteilung come? • • • More
debates within the German parties • • • • German
party leaders expressed the opinion that they must
be patient • • • • A decision may be reached by
Saturday.
[ 9 2]
After a brief recess of Parliament the news on May 14
clearly indicated a pattern • • • "Postponement of the
Kreiseinteilung due to Czech Holiday" [93].
Apparently Dr. Seidler considered it bad form to
destroy Czech national aspirations of their historic rights
on the three hundredth anniversary of the Prague
Defenestrations.

"The Minister President [Seidler] wants

to spare the sensitivities of the Czechs" [94].

Further it

was decided " • • • that decisions would not be made in the
immediate future, • • • perhaps after Monday" [95].
Instead of printing the story of the failures of the
great German offensives, the May 25 edition of the Prager
Tagblatt ran a map showing the dispersal of the now five
Kreise.

(Pilsen was abandoned, but the surrounding German
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Bezirke were to be attached to the Eger Kreise.
Still nothing could be settled.

Seidler's efforts to

reach a settlement ended with his fall in July.

Baron

Hussarek, his successor, though Czech, was unloved by the
new Vienna-based Czech National Council led by Karel Kramar
himself, who three years earlier was awaiting execution for
treason.
Hussarek tried to soothe the Germans by vague promises
of partition in Bohemia but found that this only infuriated
the Czechs while not really appeasing the Germans [96].
During the last months matters had so deteriorated as
to render the empire ungovernable.

The Piave Front was

breaking up, and the Germans were in complete retreat in the
West.

Wilson's ambiguous reply to Emperor Karl's request

for peace prompted the hapless last Habsburg to make his
last-ditch effort to hold the Empire in mid-October.

"A

slapdash constitutional reform granting autonomy to the
nations in the Austrian part of the Empire was prepared in a
form of an Imperial Manifesto" [97].
to it as a "

Dr. Wiskemann refers

voice from the grave."

Even the most ardent German nationalist now recognized
that the various nationalities of the Empire no longer
needed an imperial manifesto to set up their respective
states.
states:

An official communique from the Eger City Council
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Now it has gone so far that the establishment of a
Czech State seems to be indeed the case.

It is for

that reason that our • • • just claims for the
establishment of an autonomous province of GermanBohemia be fulfilled. German Bohemia and Egerland
will never subject themselves to the Czechs.
[98]
The situation was indeed fluid, and events were occurring at
break-neck speed.
On October 29, the Bohemian citizens read that on the
day before, the Imperial Viceroy or Staathalter in Prague,
Count Coudenhove, " • • • had taken an extended vacation"
[99].

That same day, four Czech representatives of the

Vienna branch of the Czechoslovak National Council, Rasin,
Svehla, Soukup and Stribrny quietly looked over the
government in Prague in a " • • • businesslike rather than
heroic fashion"

[100].
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CHAPTER IV
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN-BOHEMIAN
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT
On the morning of October 29, 1918 the German-Bohemian
national leaders, who ten days earlier had sworn never to
subject themselves to a Czech state, woke up citizens of
Czechoslovakia.
There was no time to lose.
In answer to the Czech action on October 29, the
delegates from Bohemia met in Vienna and proclaimed the
establishment of the Autonomous Province of German Bohemia,
stating that it was to be a part of the new German-Austrian
State in accordance with Wilsonian principles of the right
of national self-determination.
The next day the Austrian National Provisional
Assembly, made up of those members of the Reichsrat who
represented German-Austria, accepted the German-Bohemian
Province as part of the new Austrian State [1].
Thus, the German areas of Bohemia were both recognized
by and represented in the de facto government of Austria.
The tenets of the German Bohemian position, as they
appeared in the Proclamation of October 29th 1918 were
fundamentally based on denials of Czech claims to the German
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territories of Bohemia.
major areas.

They can be summarized into three

"The Czechs claim German Bohemia belongs,

historically, to their state but yellowing parchment cannot
abolish the living rights of the German people" [2].
The Germans pointed out what they saw as glaring
inconsistencies and double standards in the Czech
Staatsrecht historical claims.
The Czechs, who, on the basis of the nationality
principle claim Hungarian Slovakia, although it
has historically never been part of their state,
have no right to deny the German people that same
nationality principle [in their desire to remain
Austrian]. The Czechs further claim that to retain
German-Bohemia [the Germans preferred the word
'annex'] • • • would have • • • economic and
strategic advantages • • • to their state • • • ,
but no people have the right to violate another
race to insure their own economic [prosperity] or
to insure their borders strategically.
[3]
The economic issue was indeed important for a mutual
dependency existed between the Czechs and Germans in
Bohemia.

It was a double-edged sword for the Germans of

Bohemia:

the gain of their territory meant the loss of

their principal foodstuff source, a source guaranteed them
only by inclusion into the Republic of Czechoslovakia.

At

the same time, though inclusion meant food for the Germans
in Bohemia, it meant to Austria proper the loss of her
principal industrial areas.

Bohemian coal was essential to

the life of Vienna as well as Graz, Linz and Salzburg.
The loss of German-Bohemia would make an Anschluss with
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the German Reich all the more necessary if Austria were to
survive as a state.

One can be sure that the motives of

Vienna to keep German-Bohemia were based more on the hard
facts of economics than were those of the more romantic
nationalists in Reichenberg, the new provincial capital.
The third principle of the German rejection of Czech
claims came in the form of a prophetic warning:

"If the

Czechs carry through with their 'annexation' plans, it will
only do them harm.

Czechoslovakia would then contain a

[strong] German irredenta" [4].

One would presume that

referred to a desire to again be Austrian, but it must be
remembered that most Germans believed that, in accordance
with the Wilsonian principles of national selfdetermination, an Austro-German Anschluss was imminent.
• • • frightened by the prospect of Slav domination
and worried about lack of food and fuel, GermanAustrians from all classes and political parties
abandoned the Habsburg throne and sought refuge in
a national destiny with their fellow Germans.
[5]
Also important is Article II of the Proclamation which
allows the Governor of Deutschbohmen control over finance,
justice and the right to raise a Volkswehr or militia.
The almost comical twist to the brazen declarations of
both sides is that neither Czech nor Bohemian-German as of
yet had any military might with which to enforce their
demands.

The Armistice would not begin for another week and
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even then most returning soldiers, especially German, were
little inclined to put their uniforms back on.

The Czechs

did have some limited resources in their re-enacted Sokol
units, and within a few weeks they would have an army; but
for the time being both lacked any real means of enforcing
their proclamations.
Within days the German delegates from Moravian and
Silesian German areas joined the Bohemians and declared
themselves part of the Austrian Republic.

And so by

November 1, all three Crownlands of the former Kingdom of
Bohemia had delegates sitting in the German-Austrian
Provisional Government in Vienna.
The German-Bohemian Province was easy to establish.
The basic outlines had been worked out on paper for nearly
twenty years.
The borders of the German Kreise were drawn according
to the electoral Bezirke of the 1907 parliamentary election
[6].

In the south a fairly homogeneous strip, the Bohemian
Forest District, lay along the frontier of Upper Austria,
and local leaders in Krumau hoped to eventually attach their
area to the administration in Linz [7].
In the north and west of Bohemia (which bordered
Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria, not Austria)
concentration of Germans.

lived the largest

The nationalist stronghold of
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Reichenberg was the obvious choice for its capital and was
soon considered the capital of all German-Bohemia [8], with
Radical Party Deputy, Dr. Raphael Pacher, as its governor.
Moravia and Silesia, having a different history in
regards national demarcation, were a bit more complicated.
Southern Moravia, like southern Bohemia, had an indisputable
strip of German territory which ran along Austria's northern
border.

The German-Moravian leaders in the southern

Moravian city of Znaim hoped to incorporate it eventually
into lower Austria [9].
In Austrian-Silesia the German Nationalist Party Deputy
Dr. Freissler became governor and set up his government in
Trappau; he claimed responsibility for the Germans of
Silesia, North Moravia and parts of East Bohemia; and, after
rejecting the proposed name of Altvaterland, gave this
combined area the name of Sudetenland, which later became
the general term for all German areas in Czechoslovakia
[ 10] •

In Moravia there existed several Deutche Sprachinseln-Brunn, Olmutz, Zwitlau, and others--and so a fifth national
council was set up for Brunn and central Moravia.

(See

Appendix, Map 4.)
The fact that the greatest number of Germans living in
the Crownlands did not border the German-Austrian state was
not of great concern.

The day after Emperor Karl's
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abdication on November 11, 1918, the Austrian Democratic
Republic proclaimed itself part of the German Republic.
At the time, the individual provisional governments set
up in Reichenberg, Troppau, Krumau and Zniam seemed the
best transitional arrangement until the awaited Anschluss
could be completed [11].

Those areas not attached to

Austria proper would then simply become parts of Bavaria,
Saxony and Prussia later.
In early November Dr. Pacher was offered the post of
Minister of Education in the new Austrian Socialist
Government of Karl Renner, and he took it.

Dr. Rudolph

Lodgmann, Progesssive German Party leader, took over the
governorship from Pacher and chose the able Social Democrat
Joseph Seliger as his deputy governor.
It must be remembered that the Germans of the most
radical nationalist variety did not advocate Zweiteilung,
but total domination of Bohemia such as suggested in the
Linz Plan and the Easter Demands of 1916.

Thus, the leaders

of the German-Bohemian Provisional Government were not of
that type and should never be compared with Henlein or the
Nazis of seventeen years later.

George Schonerer and

Hermann Wolf were indeed Bohemians from Egerland, but they
were not part of the then-German leadership.
The new democratic government of Renner and Adler had
no problem with the establishment of the Czechoslovak
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Republic; they actually sent congratulatory greetings to
Prague.

It was only the territorial delimitations that were

at issue [12].

The Renner government therefore recognized

the government at Prague and hoped to open doors for
discussions by sending Lodgmann to Prague to discuss food
and coal shipments as early as October 30, 1918.

It seems

the Czechs had halted shipments of what they now considered
their coal from German North-Bohemia to Vienna--a city
highly dependent on the food and resources the vast empire
had previously supplied [13].
Lodgmann was instructed to skirt the territorial issue
and discuss aid only, but the Czechs would have no part of
it.

Discussions precluded recognition of authority in the

German areas and so, with neither accepting the credentials
of the other, the talks could not even begin.

On November 4

Seliger himself tried his hand but was rebuffed with the
famous remark, " • • • with rebels we do not negotiate,"
first used in 1848 by Prince Windischgraetz to the Czechs
during the Prague uprising.
Besides the terrible lack of food and fuel and probably
because of it, Lodgmann was faced with another problem.
There was, beginning in November, an increase in social
unrest that had a Bolshevik hue to it.

Reports from the

workers' districts of German cities in North-Bohemia were
increasing.

The November 34d Prager Tagblatt reported,
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The city [Aussig, Lodgmann's own constituency] and
environs today looked like a scene from the Russian
Revolution. • • • The rice grainery was burned and
millions worth of food and clothing have been
plundered, • • • machine gun fire could be heard
• • • six persons die.
[14]
There was nothing unique about the troubles in Aussig.
On November 4 the press reported that in Innsbruck and Linz
• • • crowds formed demanding their October
allotments of sugar from the Neftomitzer Refinery
• • • and were under the leadership of soldiers.
City militia with machine guns have taken up
positions.
[15]
The fighting ended in the trenches and was resumed in
the streets as the soldiers began coming home.

Many

returning soldiers were of a definite leftist bent.

The

horror of the trenches produced few monarchists and made
Socialists out of many nationalist bourgeoisie of pre-War
days.

This new communist inclination had many leaders

worried, Lodgmann among them.
OCCUPATION
As mentioned above, the German-Bohemian government had
precious little at its disposal with which to squelch social
unrest.

Help would have to come from elsewhere.

Lodgmann had two choices:

Governor

appeal to the German Reich for

troops across Bohemia's northern and western borders (Aussig
lies only 30 miles from the Saxon border, 130 miles from
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Austria), or request military aid from the now-growing
Czechoslovak Army.
The latter would be forthcoming if summoned, but
Lodgmann correctly feared, as he states in a letter to
Pacher,
• • • solicitation of Czech military aid to
squelch unrest would, in effect, dislodge the
German [government in Bohemia] and recognition of
[the] Czech Army and nation would follow.
[16]
The former had little hope for success for, as early as
mid-October, the idea of a German Reich military
intervention in German-Bohemia had been rejected by Wilhelm
II himself.

Only the representatives of the German General

Staff were in favor of such action.

The representatives of

the Saxon Legation in Vienna observed dryly, " • • • the
gentlemen of the military are always willing to march off
somewhere" [17].
prevailed.

As it turned out, however, cooler heads

The Saxon Legate in Vienna advised his capital

in late October:
• • • such action [as suggested by the
aforementioned General Staff] would disrupt the
peace negotiations [then underway] • • • and poison
our [Saxony's] advantagous relationship with our
Czech neighbor.
[18]
In the end it was to the Czech authorities that the
plea went.

And, as Lodgmann had feared, the Czechs did not

come to squelch unrest but to occupy.
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On November 10, the Saxon Attache, Bendorff, attached
to the Saxon Legation in Vienna, sent Dresden reports that
• • • the Czechoslovak military has been moving
into both partially and wholly German settled areas
[of Bohemia] • • • and [units] are moving into the
Sudetenland of [North Moravia and Silesia].
[19]
The Czechs, starting from Aussig, slowly and meeting
virtually no resistance, began occupying German Bohemia.
Again Vienna and Reichenberg appealed to Saxony for
assistance, this time, however, not to restore order but to
help the German-Bohemians push back the Czechoslovak
"invaders."
Bendorff to Dresden:
They [Austrian Provisional National Assembly] have
requested of me to convey the request of immediate
arms and munitions. Czech border officials [are]
disarming returning German-Bohemian troops at the
borders • • • very little ordinance on hand • • •
Saxon attack desired only as last resort.
[20]
On the eve of the Armistice of November 11 in Germany and a
full week after that of Austria-Hungary, the Vienna
representative of the German General Staff, General von
Crabon, designated which arms would be required to repel the
Czechoslovak army of the Allied Powers:

II

twelve

artillery pices, 12,000 shells, 3000 rifles with 1.5 million
rounds, 30 machine guns with 300,000 rounds •

II

[21] •

Germany at this time, besides having her own domestic
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clashes, was attempting to put on her best face for the
upcoming peace conference.

Aiding in military action

against a recognized government of the Entente, which
Czechoslovakia now was, was hardly consistent with this
attitude.
Dresden and Berlin spoke volumes by their refusal to
even reply to Vienna's requests.
DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGNS
Throughout mid-November Czech troops returning from
Italy and France, Sokols and returning Czech Legionniers,
and a newly-organized home army, of which more shall be
said, were moving into the isolated mid-Moravian German
"language islands."
Lodgmann then appealed to President Wilson through the
neutral Swedish Embassy on November 13.
In the name of 2.5 million Germans in Bohemia who,
appealing to the right of self-determination,
consider themselves a • • • part of the free German
Austrian Republic [proclaimed the day before]
• • • • We protest against the armed forces of the
Czech State.
It is plain that the Czechs want the
German population to relinquish its right to selfdetermination and to forestall a free agreement
• • • at the Peace Conference.
[22]
The German-Austrian government sent notes to Washington in
support of Lodgmann, one of which came in the form of a
proposed solution.

After reiterating the argument extolling
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the true German character of the territory under question,
the new Foreign Minister, Dr. Otto Bauer, challenged the
Allies, "If the Allied Powers have no doubt

•

•

•

I

" ln
.

terms of the German-Bohemian loyalty to the German-Austrian
Republic:
• • . the • • • Government proposes, • • • without
delay, • • • a plebiscite • • • guided by neutral
authorities. The Austro-German Government asks the
Allied Powers not to decide upon the fate of the
people in question except upon the basis of this
plebiscite.
[23]
What Bauer was requesting is that decisions not be made
on the basis of the Czechoslovak faits accomplis, i.e.,
occupation.

Bene~,

meanwhile, was attempting that very

thing, namely to secure diplomatic territorial recognition
based on occupation, which, by December, was all but
complete.
To understand the position the Entente took in response
to the requests of Lodgmann and Bauer, one must first
understand the relationship between
Bene~,

Bene~

and the Entente.

in order to secure both the means and the sanction of

occupation, needed to convince his Allies of the value of a
strong Czech military position in Central Europe.

This he

did first by understanding their goal--the defeat of
Germany; and secondly their fear--communist agitation in
East-Central Europe.
As early as October 1918, the Czech leaders were
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working on the establishment of a Czech army within the
homeland.

When in late October the plan was put forward for

an Allied offensive from the southeast, Austria-Hungary was
seen as the ideal springboard for such an attack.
The plans of October 31 called for
• • • free movement over road and rail in AustroHungarian territory. Armies shall occupy such
strategic points as they deem necessary • • • to
conduct military operations or maintain order.

[24]
This was Benes' chance.

What better way to get a military

force into Bohemia than to offer one's services for the
movement through territory about which French, British and
American commands knew so little and the Czech units
fighting in Italy and France knew so much?

With Czech

forces " • • • occupying such strategic points as they deem
necessary • • • ," the Czechoslovak National Council would
be in complete military and territorial control of the
Crownlands and Slovakia by mid-November, or so Benes
thought.
Unfortunately for

Bene~,

Germany was unwilling to

cooperate with his scheme and surprisingly signed the
Armistice on November 11.

In one fell swoop there was no

longer a need for an Allied presence in the crumbling
empire.
Thus

Bene~

could not get an army into Czechoslovakia on
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the Allied Powers' coat tails, but he did have one great
advantage.

The nullification of the offensive plan left no

plan at all.

Neither power had, in November 1918, any

articulated plan for the defunct

empire--Bene~

would fill

that vacuum [25].
Bene~

By November 9,

had notified Kram&r, now in

Prague, that a French military mission to Prague would
organize a Czechoslovak army, not composed of Allied troops,
but of Czech troops •
• • • by military convention between Czechoslovakia
and France • • • Czech forces technically became
Allied troops and • • • could participate in
carrying out the terms of the Armistice • • • which
included the right to 'occupy strategic points'
within Austro-Hungarian territory such as the
Bohemian borderlands of the west.
[26]
What is more, the Czechoslovak Army was placed under the
command of Marshal Foch, Supreme Allied Commander--no one
could question its authority.
How did

Bene~

pull it off?

Unable to get into Czechoslovakia once the offensive
was cancelled,

Bene~

then convinced the Allies that a

Czechoslovak military presence in Central Europe was the
only thing between order and anarchy--between democracy and
communism.
The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, still operating out
of Paris, sent his own diplomatic communique to London,
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Washington and Paris to counter Bauer's proposed plebiscite
idea.

Bene~

painted a picture of utter chaos in Austria and

blamed it on Bauer.
The German population of Bohemia • • • is quietly
accepting its incorporation with the Czecho-Slovak
State. It is only Vienna by agitating Bohemia that
wishes to discredit us (to the Entente) • • • • (The
Vienna Government threatens the Entente with
Bolshevik revolution in Vienna) and [blames] the
Czechs because [we] • • • refuse to supply Vienna
with food and coal.
[27]
Vienna was indeed starving and freezing in winter 191819.

According to American Relief Administration personnel

in a missive dated 16 December, "We [have] a most acute
situation in Vienna which city has less than ten day's
supply of food."

And in early January, "We [are] only days

away from starvation in Vienna.

The Communists are

conspiring to take over" [28].
Benes goes on to say in his missive to Lansing:
• • • it should be noted that Vienna continues to
send arms across Bavaria and Saxony to equip [the
Bohemians]. Mr Bauer • • • is a minority Socialist
who participated in the Bolshevik revolution in
Petrograd in 1917.
(29]
Dr.

Bene~

did not disclose his sources of information

on arm shipments.
To cure the "communist plague" in central Europe,
suggested that

Bene~
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Prague be permitted to establish order within its
territories of the Historic Borders [and that]
• • • a temporary decision [be made] to be later
examined, • • • but, for the present the German
inhabitants and adjacent [Austrian] Government
would have to submit to the arrangement.
[30]
Bene~

entreated his most agreeable ally, France, to

obtain a joint declaration of approval for the provisionary
acceptance of the occupation as a territorial delimitation.
Knowing the resolve, especially of Washington, in remaining
aloof until a conference could be convened, France attempted
to obtain no joint declaration, but instead acted
independently, as it already had in Czechoslovak matters,
and approved

Bene~'

request of provisional territorial

recognition, thus, in effect, presenting the United States
and Great Britain with a diplomatic fait accompli [31].
The British were genuinely concerned about the vast
German populations in Bohemia and thought about perhaps
attaching some indisputable German-Bohemian salients, such
as Rumfort, Eger and even Reichenberg, Lodgmann's capital,
to the German Reich [32].
But, in the interest of Allied cooperation, France
convinced Great Britain to communicate with Vienna, though
Lloyd-George took a slightly different tack.

He informed

Bauer that a plebiscite could not be conducted, as all
territorial matters must wait for the Peace Conference.
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[We] are of the opinion that pending the decision
• • • the frontier of the Czechoslovak Republic

should coincide with the historical boundaries of
the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian
Silesia.
[33]
This, of course, though couched in somewhat more
provisional and noncomittal language, is, in essence,
exactly what the Czechs wanted.

The next day Italy joined

England; Benes had three out of four.
The Americans were the most unbending and rejected any
discussion at all until the Conference.
It was not that Washington was unconcerned or even
ignorant, as

Clemen~eau

supposed her to be.

Indeed the

Americans were so concerned primarily about their ignorance
of the "terra incognite" of East Central Europe that they
commissioned the "Inquiry," a group of 150 "experts" headed
by one Dr. Mezes, to investigate and gather information
which would be pertinent to the Peace Conference.

The

Inquiry had spent more than a year collecting information,
much of which Masaryk feared could ultimately lead the
Americans to grant German-Bohemia self-determination.
Pending the evaluations of the Inquiry on which the
whole American position hinged, neither Wilson nor his
representative in Paris, Colonel House, would grant the
German-Bohemians the right to a pre-Conference plebiscite.
Nor would they recognize the Czech occupation of GermanBohemia as a de facto territorial determination.

The
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American policy of waiting it out had, by mid-December,
become a policy that could no longer be followed, however.
Colonel House in Paris was becoming ever more
apprehensive about the threat of Bolshevism in central
Europe--especially in Vienna.

When he tried to get coal

supplies to the Austrian capital he got a quick lesson in
geography.

House, therefore, had no choice but to entreat

Masaryk, now also in Paris, to supply Vienna with what the
Czechs considered their Bohemian coal.
I [House] had Frazier take Hoover • • • to see
President Masaryk, and authorized him to say that
the United States would condemn • • • prevention of
coal going into Austria for the relief of the
suffering population.
[ 34]
Masaryk's reply to Hoover is predictable:

"[He]

claimed that the coal mines were in possession of the
[Bohemian] Germans • • • it was impossible for him to take
action • • • " [ 3 5] •
Masaryk and Benes saw the chink in the American policy.
Benes, in his note to Lansing of November 20, had already
claimed that in order to insure production in the German
coal areas, the Czechoslovak territorial jurisdiction must
be spelled out.

Because " • • • lawless bands," which

Bene~

claimed Bauer supported with arms, have "prevented the
mining of coal and its transportation to Vienna" [36].
Although Benes had addressed his plea for territorial
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recognition to Lansing, it was Colonel House and his staff-Walter Lippmann of the "Inquiry," Stephen Bonsal and
others--who would carry on the negotiations.
Once negotiations for coal to Vienna started, Colonel
House and his staff were caught in the dilemma resulting
from, on the one hand, granting power to a recognized
government and on the other hand postponing any decision
concerning the territorial limits of that government's
power [37].
According to Benes (and only Benes), the United States
government then gave an oral, unofficial consent to Czech
occupation.

No record shows that any such consent was ever

given [38] •
Coal was not received in Vienna for another month.
Meanwhile during November and December 1918, one town
after another was "falling" to the "Allied" army.

On

November 16, Prague severed communications between the
German-Bohemian capital and her Austrian parent.

" •••

Telegrams and letters between the Austrian Parliament and
Reichenberg have been intercepted and banned by Czech postal
officials • • • " [39].
Between December 7 and 11 Teplitz, Pribram, Marienbad
and Aussig (Aussig for the second time) quietly delivered
themselves to the Czech army.

Teplitz, only days earlier,

had been considered for the future capital of German-Bohemia

114
due to its more central location than Reichenberg.
On December 12, 1918, with rumors of Czech movement
toward Reichenberg, the German-Bohemian provisional
government and Zweiteilung effectively came to an end.
The Provisional Government [of Deutschboehmen)
around seven o'clock this morning, climbed into
trucks and fled to foreign soil. • • • The rooms
of the government at the Hotel 'Goldener Loewe' have
been searched but as yet the Czechoslovak troops
have not entered the city • • • a late hour
telegram places [Governor] Dr. Lodgmann [and
company] in Freidland • • • [on the Bohemian Saxon
border] •
[ 40]
Ironically, the Czech troops did not actually enter
Reichenberg until several days later to a generally
indifferent reception.

But Lodgman, Seliger and others were

now gone, never to return.
By December 14 the erstwhile German-Bohemian leaders
had established a government in exile from Vienna issuing
proclamations and diplomatic protests as Deutschboehmen
herself melted away.
Dr. Freissler, Governor of the Sudetenland, held on
until February 1919 and made some honest efforts to procure
autonomy within the Czechoslovak State.

The government of

Znaim held on longest, until March, but only because it was
challenged last.
Tomas Masaryk made his presidential inaugural speech on
December 22, 1918.

He and Eduard Benes had their faits
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accomplis to offer up at the Conference in Paris three weeks
prior to the opening sessions.
LAST HOPES FOR GERMAN BOHEMIA
By the time the Paris Peace Conference actually got
underway, the Czech occupation of German-Bohemia was an
accomplished fact.

It was recognized by the "Big Four"--

albei t to varying degrees--as a basis for settlement.
Foreign Minister Dr. Eduard

Bene~

had little more to say

than to claim the old borders of the Three Bohemian
Crownlands as they existed in 1914 which, for the first time
in their history, the Czechs fully controlled.
The attitude of the Big Four during

Bene~'

initial

appearance on February 5, 1919 " • • • indicated that they
took the existence of the Czechoslovak State for granted"
[41].

According to the minutes of

Bene~'

address, Lloyd-

George actually interrupted him to say that, " • • • no
arguments to prove the necessity of [the] annexation of
Slovakia were needed--all four Statesmen were convinced of
it" [42].
This was not the end of it, however.

Though

Bene~,

Masaryk and Kramar had supplied their own plan of action
where the Allies had none concerning the defunct Habsburg
Empire, the fundamental differences between France, Great
Britain and America as to the validity of Czechoslovak
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claims required that the final decision of the "Big Four"
(which must be unanimous) be based on the findings of the
"Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs."
The hope among the German-Bohemian leaders for a
favorable decision based on the findings of the "Commission"
was complicated, however, by the appointment of French
Ambassador Jules Cambon as the chairman.

The Commission was

from the beginning heavily loaded toward the well-known
French position vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia.
At the first meeting of the Commission the French
accepted all Benes' claims with no reservations and was able
to get blanket approval from Great Britain, Italy and the
United States on the issue of the 1914 borders.
There were voices of reservation, however, chiefly from
the American experts assigned to the Commission.

Though

genuinely concerned over the dismissal of the principle of
national self-determination in the German-Bohemian case,
they also knew that the wholesale convocation of the
principle was impractical, given the economic and strategic
realities.

There also existed the danger of creating a

precedent of national demands in, for example, Ireland,
India or the Philippines.
Though anything but ill-informed [43], the Americans
who were assigned to the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs
were ill-equipped to match the French in diplomacy and

117
negotiations.

The Wilsonian dream of a just settlement

based on correct information supplied by "experts" gave the
American delegation little to work with against the
"politicians" of, especially, the French.
By mid-March the "Commission" advised the inclusion of
three million Germans into the Czechoslovak State.
THE PLEBISCITE QUESTION
Because the plebiscite was never held, the question of
exactly where the population's sympaties lay cannot be
easily answered.
Ideologically-charged historiographies tend to give
their own answers which range from current Soviet to
Novotnyan; Nazi to Czech Republican.
Neither the elected officials nor party distribution
acted as a viable political barometer of the times, for
although elected by universal suffrage, the last Austrian
general elections were held in 1911.

The lapse between then

and late 1918 must be measured in more than time alone.

The

electorate had simply experienced too much for the elected
to still claim the people's unquestioned mandate.
In order to divine what was really going on in the GermanBohemian heart and mind one must read between the lines.
General Populations' Relation to Their Government
The question is then to what extent were the people

118

linked to the aspirations of their leaders in GermanBohemia?

Was it a popular movement, or merely the

activities of a small group of men whose political
livelihood depended on assuming the leadership of a proGerman-Bohemian position?
As already mentioned, the Provincial Government's first
concern was procurement of food and fuel, its second to
squelch unrest.

It was in this turbulent medium that the

province was founded in Vienna
• • • by a purely legislative act • • • about
which the people [of German Bohemia] knew nothing
for an entire week • • . because the Provincial
Government neglected to establish a publicity
department.
[44]
In fact, a close look at the activities of the
Reichenberg government display a surprisingly poorly
organized and ineffectual body claiming to be the voice of
the people.
The general population was in such a state of
collapse that the government could expect little
enthusiasm for its activities--demands couched in
nationalistic slogans that only tended to
complicate matters.
[45]
An article in a major Reichenberg newspaper is
especially telling of the opinions of at least many Germans
that predates the Czechoslovak Declaration of State on
October 29, 1918.
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The overheated fantasies which the German
politicians throw at us are insane! The Czechs
yearn for peace just as we do. • • • It is not
trenches and barricades we must build along the
language borders [Sprachengrenze] but to strike a
political [as opposed to military] tactic coming
from enlightened, trustworthy representatives.

(46]
The relations between the German-Bohemian middle class
and their government is of interest here.

Many viewed the

Viennese government of Renner and Bauer--as they did that of
Ebert in Berlin--as being too "Red" for their liking and
preferred the more moderate bourgeois climate of
Czechoslovakia [47].
When questioned in an interview about this, Victor
Adler rejected such notions, but with some reservations •
• • • the overwhelming majority of the middle
class, as do the working class, are against uniting
German-Bohemia with the Czech State.
If a portion
of the middle class view things differently • • •
they have been [seduced] by promises of food from
the Czechs.
[ 48]
This "seduction" may well be true.

There were reports

that returning German-Bohemian soldiers would attempt to
smuggle their weapons into Bohemia, not to join the
Volkswehr but to trade them to the Czechs for food.
In any case, the conservative leanings of the GermanBohemian middle class were only an indication of the much
stronger sentiments of the German-Bohemian industrialists in
general.
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Industry's Relation to the German-Bohemian Government
On October 2, 1918, Czech Representative Dr. Stanek
addressed a turbulent House of Deputies in the Vienna
Parliament.

He said:

II

• We demand a free

Austria • • • and the establishment of a Czechoslovak State
is the smallest of our demands!!"

German-Bohemian

Representative Dr. Wichel cried out, "What about the Germans
in Bohemia?"
owners!"

Stan~k's

reply:

"Ask the German factory

[ 49] •

The German-Bohemian industralist had much to gain by
attaching the German areas to the Czechoslovak State--and
much to lose if they did not.

Besides the obvious reasons

of mutual economic dependency between agriculturally-rich
"Czechia" and mineral-rich German-Bohemia, an AustriaGermany Anschluss, if carried through, would pit GermanBohemian industry against that of the German Reich's much
greater industrial capacity.
Even without the Anschluss, the Austrian market, good
as it might be, would undoubtedly be hindered by
Czechoslovak duties on all shipments passing through
undisputed Czech lands between industrial German North
Bohemia, the Sudetenlands, and German Silesia en route to
Austria.
That the industrialists wished to do business with
Prague, not Reichenberg, is definite.
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It was not only the industrialists of Northern
Bohemia, but also those of Northern Moravia who
were [by 1919] at any rate for the Czechoslovak
State.
[50]
The growing social unrest was also of great concern to
the industrialist class.

It condemned the practice of the

Reichenberg government to attempt negotiations
• • • on purely political demands [and suggested]
industrial representatives of both sides to
negotiate a quick settlement • • • for, [they
warned,] • • • the social unrest had become so
acute that • • • if an agreement didn't quickly
come from above • • • a settlement would from
below.
[51]
Apparently at least some German-Bohemia industrialists and
Bene~

shared the same fears of Bolshevism.

Military Relation to the German-Bohemian Government
The futile attempt of the Provincial Government to
raise a Volkswehr, as already shown, sheds light on the
government-to-citizen relationship.
In a letter written by a soldier-council leader to exGovernor Raphael Pacher on November 31, 1919, the general
misgivings over being drafted for the Volkswehr are evident.
"We want immediate disarmament and have no more inclination
to be soldiers; come what may, we've had our fill"

[52].

The militia that did exist was basically a collecting
place for those individuals unable to find their way back to
a civilian profession [53].

Many of these were carrying
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revolutionary ideas back from the trenches and attached
themselves to the "Peoples' Soviets" scattered throughout
Austra and German-Bohemia, but were never coordinated into
any real action.

They eventually evaporated as the Czechs

moved in.
A written communique from the District National
Committee of Tachau, an all-German Kreis, is telling of the
feelings of at least a portion of the German-Bohemian
people:
Unfortunately a great part of the urban as well as
rural citizens have been incensed by returning
German soldiers due to worry over food and basic
supplies, the lack of action of the German-Bohemian
Government, the unrest in German-Bohemia and the
thoroughly unfavorable provisions of the ceasefire.
Finally, due to the economic ties of our areas to
that of the Czechs • • • there remains nothing left
but to attach on to the Czechoslovak State. Yes, a
great part of the people wish it and it would be
best for all.
[54]
When questioned on February 5, 1919, " • • • whether
the inhabitants of these [German] districts, if offered the
choice, would vote for exclusion from the Czechoslovak State
or for inclusion • • • " Dr.

Bene~

answered Lloyd-George that

they would vote for exclusion [55].
Because this stands on the record and seems to be
contrary to Bene~' own statement of the Germans "quietly
accepting" Czech rule as well as the testimony above, the
statement warrants explanation.
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Bene~,

ever vigilant to cast aspersions on the Vienna

government, explained that such a decision to not join
Czechoslovakia would be the result of Bolshevik propaganda
emanating from the Renner-Bauer government.

That is to say

that the German-Bohemians were being duped by the Austrian
Social Government for Austria's own reasons (56].

If this

is true, one must remember that Austria's reasons to retain
German Bohemia were based on desperate attempts to hold her
former industrial possessions--an understandable economic
imperative.
Secondly, the social unrest that

Bene~

blamed on Vienna

justified the Czechoslovak Army and excused its occupation
of all Bohemia.
In all, it is difficult to say exactly which way a
plebiscite would have gone.

It is equally difficult to

determine just what the basis of a plebescite would be.
Self-determination meant different things to different
people.

Some may have feared that the maintenance of a

provincial relationship with truncated Austria might only be
possible with an Austro-German Anschluss.

Othen may have

wished the direct attachment to the Reich for purely
geographical reasons, even though those very regions, which,
though not connected, lay alongside the Reich, would have
suffered economically.

Some favored an autonomous position

within Czechoslovakia--a kind of Swiss system.

Others even
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envisioned German Bohemia becoming an independent country
and a ward of the League of Nations.
It is quite possible that even if a majority wished to
be excluded from Czechoslovakia, a general consensus as to
where they wished to be included would have been
unreachable.

For one must also remember that the German

areas of the Crownlands had all experienced different
cultural and social histories.

Industrial North Bohemia,

for example, has very little in common with almost feudal
South Moravia.
In real and practical terms, a plebiscite, the purpose
of which would be to gauge the feelings of the Bohemian
Germans, would have been impractical and inaccurate, if not
impossible.
The various territorial settlements of Czechoslovakia's
neighbors outlined the new "Successor State" along the new
universally-recognized "Historical Borders" of the
Staatsrecht principle (except for a few all-German salients
which went to the Weimer Republic and which Prague was happy
to see go) •
Dr. Rudolph Lodgmann became the leader of the so-called
"Negativists," who refused politically to take part in
Czechoslovak politics.

A large part of the old German

political guard, however, had sufficient political sense to
realize--much as the "New Czechs" had in the 1880's--that
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one must work within the political structure if one expects
a voice in affairs.

These "Activists" or "Positivists"

eventually fell into mainstream Czechoslovak politics, while
others kept the German Nationalist home fires burning-possibly awaiting a messiah.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Beginning in 1526 the once-independent Bohemian
Crownlands were ruled from Vienna in an ever-tightening
policy of Austro-German hegemony and centralization.

With

the Enlightenment came the birth of nationalism which
affected both the Central European Germans and their desire
for a single nation-state and the oppressed nationalities of
the Habsburg Empire, especially the Czechs, in their desire
for the re-establishment of their own state.

In Bohemia,

where both Czechs and Germans had lived for centuries, the
clash was inevitable and its reasons complex.
By 1848 the republicanism of France, once imported to
Central Europe, had distorted into a web of German-Austrian
rivalry with the Czechs caught in the middle.

Many Austro-

Germans, and especially those in Bohemia, desired a great
United Germany with Austria participating in a Frankfurtcentered federal republic.

The Czechs, in seeing such a

unity as the destruction of their hopes for the redemption
of the Czech State, allied themselves with the Austrian
Crown against the German Liberals in an attempt to preserve
the Habsburg Empire and their own national survival.
In Bohemia the delicate national balancing act was
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further complicated by the social upheavals of the
industrial revolution, which caused vast numbers of Czechs
to migrate from their central agricultural districts into
the mountainous German industrial centers in order to find
work.
To the migrating Czech it meant simple economic
survival; to the Czech nationalist leaders the migration
represented the "taking back" of the Czech Crownlands from
the "invading" German settlers.

To the German worker it

meant competition for jobs; to the German nationalist
leaders the Czech migration represented a Slavic invasion of
the superior German culture and character of the all-German
Bohemian districts.
Attempts to politically isolate the Czechs through an
elaborate curial system of artifically creating a German
electoral majority eventually failed as the Czechs began
using the system to their own advantage due to a marked
amelioration of the Czech socio-economic position during
the latter third of the nineteenth century.
Finally, after a flurry of pro-Czech legislation, the
German-Bohemians sought to establish the administrative
ethnic partition of Bohemia as the only way to preserve the
racial integrity of all their German districts.

The Czech

counter-position to this German Zweiteilung was Staatsrecht,
that is the principle that the Crownland's borders were
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externally inviolable and internally indivisible and that
the Germans must accept the fact that all Bohemians, Czech
and German, have free access within the so-called "Historic
Borders."
German proposals were rebuffed by the Czechs.

The

intransigence of both sides led to wholesale obstructionism
in each successive weak coalition government from 1871 to
the Empire's demise in 1918.
During the First World War, Tomas Masaryk and Eduard
Benes in exile worked with the Entente in an effort to
establish an independent Czechoslovakia--something even the
most ardent Czech nationalist at home had never proposed.
Indeed, the Czechs had always maintained the necessity of a
strong empire--albeit a federalized one.
With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, both
Zweiteilung and Staatsrecht paradoxically existed within
Bohemia, with the Czechoslovak government in Reichenberg
claiming allegiance to the new Republic of Austria.
The German-Bohemians (and Vienna) desperately embraced
the principles of self-determination.

The Czechs, however,

by establishing a fait accompli by military occupation, by
correctly pointing out the overwhelming economic and
strategic necessity in keeping Bohemia whole, and by
masterful manipulation of Allied fears of Bolshevism, French
revanchement and everyone's desire for a speedy settlement,
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were able to outstrip the highly principled but inapplicable
ideologies of Wilson and establish the Republic of
Czechoslovakia with three million Germans within its
borders.
The short-lived German-Bohemian government was never
really a viable entity, but a reflection of the truly
desperate situation the new Austrian government faced once
the disintegration of the empire had denied food and fuel so
necessary for survival.

As for the German people in

Bohemia, evidence would indicate that all industry and most
of the German middle class wished incorporation into
Czechoslovakia.
A plebiscite, as was proposed by Vienna, would have
been difficult to administer due chiefly to the unsettled
international situation.

For one thing, much would have

depended on whether an Austro-German Anschluss would have
been permitted.
Despite criticism that all would have been different
had three million Germans not been included in
Czechoslovakia, the gentlemen in Paris, lacking any oracle
to divine the future, made the only right choice.

Did the

Bohemian-Germans then have a legitimate right to the
territorial demarcation in pre-War Bohemia?

Based on

generally accepted notions of the rights of cultural and
economic preservation, the answer must certainly be yes.
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To the Germans of Bohemia, their "home" was being
invaded, and their home was simply that soil which they and
their ancestors had occupied for centuries.

They were not

Germans from Germany, but Bohemians from Bohemia.

What is

more, the Germans who had settled in the mountains centuries
earlier had not displaced Czechs as the Czechs were most
certainly doing in their own economically-induced migration
west into the German areas during the nineteenth century.
Did, then, the Czechs have a legitimate right to
migrate into the German areas in pre-War Bohemia?

Based on

the simple necessities of economics and the basic human need
for survival, again the answer must be yes.
To the Czechs, the changing economic pattern of the
times simply implied the need to relocate within the country
in order to eke out a living.

If the admittedly medieval

principle of Staatsrecht served to effectively thwart that
impediment to the economic survival of the Czechs, then its
use was as justified as the German principle of Zweiteilung
which it challenged.
To understand the application of these principles one
must first understand the development of Staatsrecht.

In

actuality Zweiteilung was the consequence of Czech denial of
German Staatsrecht, for by the mid-nineteenth century the
meaning of Staatsrecht had become something other than what
it originally had been.
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Shortly after the Bohemian Crownlands had become merely

the hereditary property of the ruling Austrian Habsburg
Hausmacht, new definitions of man's place in his country and
society had been formed.

Emanating from revolutionary

France had come the notion that one is no longer merely a
subject of the almighty Crown, but a citizen of the state-an equal participant subject to institutions of one's own
making in a land of fellow citizens.

A person became his

own nobleman, subject not to a divine-rightest, high born
monarch but to a community--a nation of his own kind.
This new concept fit the circumstances in the Czech
lands perfectly for, having been stripped of their king and
reluctant to render blind obedience to a "foreign" prince in
Vienna, the Czechs instead transferred their allegience to
their own community--to Cheeky, the Czech word for Bohemia.
The national identity needed a rallying point.

Czechs

needed something they all shared, yet no one else had.
language provided that rallying point.

The

Just as German

nationalists about the same time had suggested that the
German language should stand as the basis for unification of
"Germany," so too the Czechs saw in their language the thing
common to them which gave them a national identity.

This

same practice has been used in modern times by separatist
movements such as those found in Brittany, Provence, and the
Basque Country as a means to promote the self-identity of
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one's cultural uniqueness.

In Bohemia this sense of self was aided by national
leaders such as Palacky who, though forced to write in the
German language, showed to the Czechs that they too had a
culturally rich past in which they could take pride.

Jan

Havelecek began the Narodnf Listi during the 1830's, a
newspaper still published today; poetry, theater and a new
interest in Czech folk culture proliferated, all promoting
the use of and pride in the "national" language as a tool to
further the national mission.

The importance of language

has been demonstrated above.
This process was further strengthened by the industrial
revolution which, as has been shown, enabled hitherto
disenfranchised Czechs to move up the social and political
ladder.

Significantly, the meteoric rise of the Czech

middle class, especially after 1870, was not dependent upon
"Germanizing" one's self.

It was possible to be a success

wholly as a Czech.
Thus, one sees, the notion of Staatsrecht was
applicable after the "l'etat est moi" concept was long dead
because the notion of state had survived not as the property
of the prince but of the people of the nation.
The notion of Staatsrecht within the original, or
nearly original, borders of the state hit a snag however
when national aspirations became mixed with economical
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realities.

The Czechs could not reconcile their socio-

political ascendancy with the pro-Austrian German-Bohemians.
Nor could they apply their language theory to the Germans
which, of course, would have allowed them to join their
fellow Germans in Austria, or even the Weimar Republic.
Instead, the Czechs rather conveniently claimed Staatsrecht
in its medieval context in an attempt to deny the Germans
their own Staatsrecht in the modern context.

What was first

used as a tool to achieve Czech statehood within the
Austrian Empire was now used internally to thwart GermanBohemian self-determination.

The Czech argument was that

the old notion of Staatsrecht rendered the borders
inviolable and that the whole of Bohemia should be subject
to the majority will.

The defensive policy of Zweiteilung

was seen as secessionist and therefore the Germans as
spoilers of the Bohemian State.
The whole argument of the Czechs depended on their
interpretation of just what the German presence represented
in Bohemia.

Were they fellow Bohemians who traced an

ancestry back hundreds of years to pre-Habsburg times?

Were

they Austrians who, unlike the Czechs, remained faithful to
their sovereign in Vienna during the First World War and,
thus, was it not actually the rebellious Czechs who were
secessionists?

Or were they in fact German colonists and

invaders who sould be removed from the scene?

The Czechs
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cerainly seemed to think the Bohemian-Germans fit the latter
description when, in 1946, three million Germans were
expelled from their homes and sent "back" to Germany.

In

fact, they could be labelled as all three, but mostly they
were simply people living on their traditional land in their
traditional culture and seeking through Zweiteilung the
preservation of both.
The truth is, of course, that the German-Czech conflict
was only finally resolved by the expulsions mentioned above.
The irony is that, according to The Sudetenland
magazine, a bimonthly published by Sudetenlanders now living
in Munich, by 1973 the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had
failed, but not through lack of trying, to resettle the
mountainous areas in Bohemia where the Germans had once
lived.
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Map 1.

Long Established German Areas in the Crownland of
Bohemia.
(Based on Czechs and Germans, by Elizabeth Wiskermann.)
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Map 2.

German Population Distribution and Density in
Early Twentieth Century.
(Based on Czechoslovak
source.
The German Problem in Czechoslovakia, by
Josef Chmelar.)
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(Based on German source.
Die Tschechoslawakei in Spiegel
der Statistik, by Erwin Winkler.)
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?udweis
Pilsen
Eger
Leitmeritz
Reichenberg
Trauntenau

The Nationalist Union's German Proposal of May 1918
for the Ethnic Administrative Partition of the
Crownland of Bohemia.
A later version dropped the
city of Pilsen attaching the German Bezirke to the
Eger Kreis.
(Printed in the Prager Tagblatt, May
22, 1918.)

Map 4.

Bohemian Forest
District, cap.
Krumau
German
Moravia, cap.
Znaim.

Sudetenland, cap.
Trappau.

The Province of German-Bohemia in its Five Parts with Their
Administrative Capitals. The Moravian and Silesian German
areas are approximations based on Dr. Fleissler's claim to
represent allGermans in Sudetenland in the absence of any real
borders. Bohemian areas were well defined, however.

North~ohemia, cap.
and ProvinciaL cap.
Reichenberg
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